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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPFALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
CHARLES MOA, : Case No. 20070940-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is a consolidated appeal from two judgments of conviction. See Addendum 
A. In case no. 031903971, Charles Moa was convicted of one count of Discharging a 
Firearm Toward a Building, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
10-508 (2003), the Honorable John Paul Kennedy presiding at the Change of Plea 
hearing, and the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding at the Sentencing hearing. See 
Addendum B. In case no. 071904352, Moa was convicted of one count each of 
Discharging a Firearm From a Vehicle, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-508 (Supp. 2007), Failure to Respond to an Officer's Signal to Stop, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-210 (2005), and Aggravated 
Assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (2003), the 
Honorable Stephen L. Henriod, presiding. S^c Addendum C. Jurisdiction is conferred 
upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (Supp. 2008). ' 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Whether the trial court strictly complied with its duty to determine that 
Moa understood the nature and elements of the offense and the law in relation to the facts 
when it accepted Moa's guilty plea in case no. 031903971. 
Standard of Review: This Court will *4rcview a trial court's denial of a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea under an 'abuse of discretion' standard, incorporating the 'clearly 
erroneous' standard for the trial court's findings of fact made in conjunction with that 
decision." State v. Holland, 921 P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 1996). "However, the ultimate 
question of whether the trial court strictly complied with constitutional and procedural 
requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a question of law that is reviewed for 
correctness:' Id; see State v. I little, 2004 UT 46,fl , 94 P.3d 268 (same). 
Preservation: This Court should reach the merits of this issue under the plain error 
doctrine. The preservation rule docs not apply to plain error arguments. S^e State v. 
Tucker, 800 P.2d 819, 821 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Under the plain error doctrine, this 
Court will reverse where the defendant "establish] es| that '(0 an error exists; (ii) the error 
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the 
error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant."' 
State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, ^ [15, 95 P.3d 276 (citations omitted). 
1
 This consolidated appeal includes convictions under both the 2003 and Supp. 2007 
versions of section 76-10-508. No changes made to section 76-10-508 between 2003 and 
2007 affect the merits of this appeal. For the convenience of the Court, therefore, 
citations to section 76-10-508 in this brief refer to the 2007 version of the statute. 
2 
Alternatively, this Court should reach the merits under the doctrine of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Ineffective assistance of counsel is an "exception)'] to the 
preservation rule." State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37,fl, 46 P.3d 230. Where an ineffective 
assistance claim is "first raised on direct appeal," this Court will review it "as a matter of 
law." State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 354 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); see State v. Ison, 2006 
UT26,1H|39-43, 135 P.3d 864; State v. Macstas, 1999 UT 32,1|20, 984 P.2d 376. 
Issue 2: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in case no. 071904352 by 
failing to properly consider all legally relevant factors and by considering information 
that was not reasonably relevant or reliable when it imposed consecutive sentences. 
Standard of Review: This Court will "afford the trial court wide latitude in 
sentencing and, generally, 'will reverse a trial court's sentencing decision only if it is an 
abuse of the judge's discretion.'" State v. Bluff 2002 UT 66, T)66, 52 P.3d 1210 (citation 
omitted), cert, denied, 537 U.S. 1172 (2003). "The trial court abuses its discretion when 
it fails to consider legally relevant factors, or if the sentence imposed exceeds the limits 
prescribed by law." Id. 
Preservation: This issue is preserved because defense counsel asked the trial court 
to impose concurrent, rather than consecutive, sentences. R. 071904352 (122:4). 
Alternatively, this Court should reach the merits under rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. Rule 22(e) provides an exception to the preservation rule and allows 
this Court to "correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at 
any time." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). In addition, this Court should reach the merits under 
3 
the plain error doctrine. Sec Tucker, 800 P.2d at 821 (holding preservation rule does not 
apply to plain error arguments); Dean, 2004 UT 63 at fj|15 (outlining plain error doctrine). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following arc determinative of the issues on appeal. Their text is provided in 
full in Addendum D, 
United States Constitution Amendment XIV - Due Process; 
Utah Constitution Article I, § 7 - Due Process; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (2003) - Entering Judgment for Included Offense; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (2003) - Concurrent and Consecutive Sentences; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508 (Supp. 2007) - Discharging a Firearm; 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11-Pleas. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This appeal is a consolidation of the two cases. First, in case no. 031903971, Moa 
was charged with three counts of aggravated assault, a second degree felony/ R. 3971 
(1-3). On May 25, 2007, Moa entered a no-contest guilty plea to one count of 
discharging a Firearm toward a building, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §76-10-508(2). R. 3971 (71-72; 226:1-2, 8); sec Addendum E (pica colloquy); 
Addendum F (guilty plea affidavit). The trial court then ordered Adult Probation and 
Parole (AP&P) to prepare a presentence report (PSR). R. 3971 (71; 85; 226:12-13). 
2
 Hereinafter, case no. 031903971 will be referred to as case no. 3971. Citations to the 
record for this case will be to R. 3971 followed by the record page in parentheses. 
4 
On June 15 and 22, 2007, Moa filed pro se motions to withdraw his guilty plea. R. 
3971 (101; 103). Defense counsel also filed a motion to withdraw the guilty plea. R. 
3971 (120: 127). Following a motion hearing on October 5, 2007, the trial court denied 
the motion. R. 3971 (186; 195-96; 199; 227:21-22); sec Addendum G. Thereafter, on 
October 29, 2007, the trial court sentenced Moa to a term of three to five years in prison 
and gave Moa "credit for 148 days" served. R. 3971 (234:34-35). Moa filed a timely 
notice ofappeal. R. 3971 (205-06). 
Second, in case no. 071904352, Moa was charged with seven counts of 
discharging a firearm toward a building, a third degree felony; one count of failure to 
respond to an officer's signal to stop, a third degree felony; one count of aggravated 
assault, a third degree felony; and one count of failure to stop, a class A misdemeanor.J 
R, 4352 (2-7). A preliminary hearing was held on July 17, 2007, and Moa was bound 
over as charged. R. 4352 (22-23; 119:55-56). 
On November 13, 2007, Moa pleaded guilty to one count each of discharging a 
firearm from a vehicle, a third degree felony; failure to respond to an officer's signal to 
stop, a third degree felony; and aggravated assault, a third degree felony. R. 4352 (73-74: 
75-81; 121). The trial court then ordered AP&P to prepare a PSR. R. 4352 (73). 
On January 11, 2008, the trial court sentenced Moa to serve three to five years on 
the discharge of a firearm charge, zero to five years on the failure to respond to an 
officer's signal charge, and zero to five years on the aggravated assault charge. R. 4352 
'Hereinafter, case no. 071904352 will be referred to as case no. 4352. Citations to the 
record for this case will be to R. 4352 followed by the record page in parentheses. 
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(90-91: 122.6-7). It then ran the sentences ''consecutive to each other and all consecutive 
to any other commitment that Mr. Moa might have." R. 4352 (91; 122:7); see Addendum 
H. Moa filed a timely notice of appeal. R. 4352 (93-94; 106-12). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Statement of Facts Related to Case No. 3971. 
Moa was charged with three counts of aggravated assault, a second degree felony. 
R. 3971 (1-3). The charges stemmed from allegations that on April 4, 2003, three people, 
including Moa, discharged firearms toward three people in a business parking lot. R. 
3971 (2-3). At his initial appearance on January 2, 2007, the information containing 
these charges was read and a copy was given to Moa. R. 3971 (5). Because Moa could 
not afford an attorney, the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association (LDA) was appointed to 
represent him. R. 3971 (5-6). Thereafter, LDA withdrew because wCa conflict existjed] 
between" Moa and LDA and first conflict counsel was appointed. R. 3971 (30; 32). 
On March 1, 2007, the day of the preliminary hearing, Moa alleged ineffective 
assistance of counsel and moved to have a new attorney appointed. R. 3971 (36-37; 
234:3-7). The trial court granted the motion and continued the preliminary hearing. R. 
3971 (36-37; 234:8, 12). Thereafter, second conflict counsel was appointed. R. 3971 
(39; 41). On April 20, 2007, second conflict counsel moved to continue the preliminary 
hearing and to withdraw because he had cta conflict with representing" Moa. R. 3971 
(50; 234:14-15). The trial court granted the motion and ordered that new conflict counsel 
be appointed. R. 3971 (50; 234:16). Thereafter, third conflict counsel was appointed. R. 
3971 (55; 63; 67). 
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On May 25, 2007, while represented by third conflict counsel, Moa entered a no-
contest guilty plea to one count of discharging a firearm toward a building, a third degree 
felony. R. 3971 (71-72: 226:1-2, 8). In exchange for Moa's guilty plea, the plea affidavit 
said that Moa would receive: 
Sentence today to probation w/ 223 days jail credit for time served. 
Admitted] Nov. 4, 2006|.] All other counts dismissed!".] No other related charges 
to be filedf.] 
R. 3971 (75). The word "today" was crossed out. R. 3971 (75). At the change of plea 
hearing, the State clarified the plea deal, saying that it agreed to dismiss the three 
aggravated assault charges, that Moa "would be released today," and that it would 
"recommend^] probation" unless Moa failed to "go get his presentence report" or had 
"any violations of the criminal laws of this state or any other state between now and the 
time of sentencing/' R. 3971 (75; 226:1-2), 
The plea colloquy contained a brief discussion about the offense to which Moa 
was pleading guilty. R. 3971 (226:4-5). The trial court "ma[dcj the changes on the 
information by interlineation," and the State said that it would submit an "amended 
information reflecting the new charge" later. R. 3971 (226:4-6). The State filed that 
amended information two and one-half weeks later, on June 14, 2007. R. 3971 (98-100). 
Neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel readily recalled the Code section 
governing the offense of discharging a firearm toward a building. R. 3971 (226:4-5). 
Once the attorneys identified the appropriate Code section, the judge asked defense 
counsel whether he "had a chance to explain" the deal to Moa. R. 3971 (226:5). Defense 
counsel said, "Yes, Your Honor/' but then clarified that he "took over this case after" 
7 
second conflict counsel "had already arranged this [plea bargain] and I just reiterated it 
all and have gone over it again with [Moa] and I believe that this is our understanding o^ 
Ihc deal." R. 3971 (226:5). Moa agreed with this statement. R. 3971 (226:5-6). 
The trial court then asked defense counsel for "the factual predicate . . . for the 
plea." R. 3971 (226:6). Defense counsel said, "Judge, apparently on or about the 4lh of 
April 20031,| Mr. Moa, as a party, intentionally and knowingly discharged a firearm 
toward a building in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. That's what is written down here 
as the element and the facts, Your Honor." R. 3971 (226:6). Defense counsel's reference 
was to the plea affidavit. R. 3971 (226). That affidavit listed the "elements of the 
crime} | to which [Moa| [was] pleading guilty" as: "On or about 4/4/2003 defendant as a 
party intentionally and knowingly discharged a firearm from a vehMe toward [building]" 
in "SL County State of Utah." R. 3971 (76). The word "vehicle" was crossed out. R. 
3971 (76). The affidavit also provided these facts as "a basis for the court to accept" 
Moa\s guilty plea: "Defendant on the date and time was a party to the discharge of 
firearm within 600 feet of [building] w/oul person towards the direction of people." R. 
3971 (76).4 The trial court asked Moa if that was "what happened," and Moa said, 
"Yes." R. 3971 (226:6). No other discussion regarding the elements of the crime or the 
factual basis occurred. R. 3971 (226). 
flic factual basis in the affidavit is handwritten and difficult to decipher. See R. 3971 
(76). fhc reproduction of the factual basis provided here, therefore, is appellate 
counsel's best interpretation of the actual written document. For this Court's comparison, 
a copy of the affidavit is provided in Addendum 1;. 
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Following the colloquy, the trial court answered Moa's questions. R. 3971 
(226:10-11). First, in response to Moa's query about whether he "could get a trial," the 
trial court explained that Moa had the right to a trial, but that he "could be facing a trial 
on three 2nd Degree Felonies of Aggravated Assault," which "would be 3 to 15 and so 
[he) might be looking a t . . . 45 years." R. 3971 (226:10). Moa also "wanted to make 
sure there would be no other prosecution after this." R. 3971 (226:10). The trial court 
responded, "The only thing I can tell you is if you don't commit any more crimes . . . 
|t|here shouldn't be." R. 3971 (226:11). And the State agreed, saying, "I would just 
reiterate, Judge, because as far as this episode and he's pleading on that, legally we can't 
charge you with other crimes." R. 3971 (226:11). The trial court then accepted Moa's 
guilty plea, ordered a PSR, and ordered Moa released to Pretrial Services. R. 3971 (71; 
85; 226:12-13). 
On May 31, 2007, the State moved to revoke Moa's pretrial release because Moa 
did not report to Pretrial Services. R. 3971 (87-88). On June 9, 2007, the events leading 
to case no. 4352 occurred. R. 4352 (2-7). 
On June 15 and 22, 2007, Moa filed pro se motions to withdraw his guilty plea. R. 
3971 (101; 103). Moa asked to withdraw his guilty plea because third conflict counsel: 
failed lo object to the charges on the 25th of May when on my plea deal 1 was to 
receive the same deal as my co-defendant witch |sic| was 236 days jail, "CTS," 
sentence same day to probation, no pre sentcnc|e| report, 36 months probation, 
and a 0-5 not a 3-51.] [M |y lawyer failed to object to these changes the 
prosecution made at the last minute when we came in front of the judge. 1 was 
really confused when I was up there and thought my lawyer had everything under 
conlrolc [sic]. I seen him today and he has advised me that this is what I had to 
do. The pro-se motion to withdraw my plea and release Mr. Garcia as my lawyer 
for ineffective assistance of counsel on the grounds that he failed to object to the 
9 
sudden changes in our plea agreement that the prosecutor started throwing at us 
when we were talking to Judge Kennedy. 
R. 3971 (103) (emphases omitted). Further: Moa complained: 
I took that deal on the 25th of May and on the 31st the D.A. filed new 
charges on me saying that I retaliated against a witness or informant on March 1, 
120)07 two months before I took the deal. . . . So the D.A. filed these charges after 
J took deal hopeing [ sic J to send me to prison for violating my probation. 
R. 3971 (101). 
Because Moa alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial court granted third 
conflict counsel's motion to withdraw. R. 3971 (113). Thereafter, fourth conflict 
counsel entered an appearance and filed a motion to withdraw Moa's guilty plea. R. 
3971 (120; 127). in that motion, fourth conflict counsel said: 
Grounds for this motion are that important terms of the negotiated plea 
were altered during the plea colloquy and defendant did not have an adequate 
opportunity to discuss the changes with his attorney prior to entering the plea. 
Specifically, the changes to the agreement were: (1) that the State would agree to 
the defendant being sentenced to probation at the time of the plea; and (2) that the 
suspended sentence would be a 0-5 year prison term. During the plea colloquy, 
these terms were altered verbally and on the plea form to require a later sentencing 
date, and to increase the suspended sentence to a 3-5 year prison term. 
Further, as part of the negotiated plea, the State agreed to forego filing a 
related charge; however, the charge was filed in violation of the agreement 
(although it was later dismissed). 
R. 3971 (127). 
The trial court held a motion hearing on October 5, 2007. R. 3971 (186; 227). At 
the hearing, defense counsel stipulated that "the plea was taken in compliance with Rule 
11." R. 3971 (227:7). The State then called third confiict counsel to testify. R. 3971 
(227:10). Third confiict counsel testified that second confiict counsel filled out the plea 
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affidavit used at the change of plea hearing. R. 3971 (227:11). He also testified that 
Moa's original plea deal was the same as his co-defendant's: "[Il]e was to plead no 
contest and . . . there was supposed to be a recommendation that he would be sentenced 
to probation without the need for a pre-sentence report." R. 3971 (227:12, 17). But to 
get this deal, he needed to serve "223 days" and he "still had 11 close to a month left to 
serve in order to get his 223 days." R. 3971 (227:12-13). Moa "wanted to get out of jail 
that day" so the State offered a counter-proposal: wC[IIJe could be released that day," but if 
he was, then "this was not a zero to five, it was a three to five," and the prosecutor 
"would request a |PSRJ." R. 3971 (227:13). Moa accepted this deal. R. 3971 (227:14). 
Following the hearing, the trial court denied Moa's motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea. R. 3971 (186; 195-96; 199; 227:21-22). The trial court found that the parties 
"stipulated" that the plea complied with rule 11; third conflict counsel was "a credible 
witness"; Moa\s "physical demeanor" and "responsiveness to questions" showed that he 
"was aware of what was happening during the proceedings"; the parties "took measures 
to ensure that Mr. Moa understood what was occurring"; and the retaliation charge 
subsequently filed by the State was "unrelated to charges" in this case. R. 3971 (195-96). 
The trial court then concluded thai the guilty plea "was knowingly, intelligently and 
voluntarily made"; Moa "was not prejudiced by the filing of new charges because they 
have been dismissed"; and the new charges "did not violate the plea agreement because 
they were unrelated." R. 3971 (195-96). 
Thereafter, on October 29, 2007, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. R. 3971 
(234:29-35). The PSR recommended that the trial court sentence Moa to prison "and that 
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this case run consecutive to any other case, which is pending." R. 3971 (112:2). The 
trial court sentenced Moa to a term of three to five years in prison. R. 3971 (234:34-35). 
Moa filed a timely notice of appeal. R. 3971 (205-06). 
B. Statement of Facts Related to Case No. 4352. 
On June 15, 2007, Moa was charged with seven counts of discharging a firearm 
from a vehicle toward a building, a third degree felony; one count of failure to respond to 
an officer's signal to stop, a third degree felony; one count of aggravated assault, a third 
degree felony; and ono count of failure to stop, a class A misdemeanor. R. 4352 (2-7). 
The charges stemmed from allegations that on June 9, 2007, Moa drove a vehicle from 
which the front passenger discharged several rounds from a handgun at a residence 
and/or vehicle, failed to stop at an officer's signal, drove into a patrol vehicle during the 
ensuing chase, and fled on foot once officers stopped the vehicle. R. 4352 (6). 
The trial court originally appointed LDA to represent Moa, but because of a 
continuing conflict, fourth conflict counsel from case no. 3971 again represented Moa. 
R. 4352(11; 18; 118:3). 
On November 13, 2007, Moa pleaded guilty to one count each of discharging a 
firearm from a vehicle, a third degree felony; failure to respond to an officer's signal to 
stop, a third degree felony; and aggravated assault, a third degree felony. R. 4352 (73-74; 
75-81; 121). In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. R. 4352 
(121:3, 12). 
Regarding the elements of the offenses, the affidavit said: 
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(I) On June 9, 2007, defendant, as a party, discharged a firearm from vehicle with 
intent to intimidate or harass another; (II) Failed to bring his vehicle to a stop after 
having received an audible signal to stop; (III) Assaulted another with a vehicle. 
R. 4352 (76). 
Regarding the factual basis, the affidavit said: "On June 9, 2007|, | 1 was driving a 
vehicle that another discharged a firearm from, not intending to hit or hurt anyone; I 
failed to stop at officer's signal, and my vehicle hit the officer's vehicle." R. 4352 (76). 
Presenting the factual basis orally, defense counsel said: 
Your Honor, on June the 9th of 2007 my client and the co-defendant were in 
a vehicle in which a firearm was discharged with the purpose to intimidate or 
harass. 
A short time later my client was involved in a chase with the police where 
he failed to bring his vehicle to a stop after having received numerous signals, 
audible and visual, to stop his vehicle. And that during the chase, a crash ensued 
in which my client is admitting that he assaulted another through use of the vehicle 
into the other vehicle. 
R. 4352 (121:6). Moa agreed that this statement was true. R. 4352 (121:6-7). 
After some additional discussion, the prosecutor clarified, "It's got to be with 
intent to intimidate or harass another. And the reason I'm being thorough on this, Your 
Honor, is because on the last case, we had a motion to withdraw a plea." R. 4352 
(121:10). The trial court then asked Moa if "|t]he reason that [he| drove over there with 
the guy with the gun was to intimidate somebody." R. 4352 (121:10). In response, Moa 
said. "No." R. 4352 (121:10). wiIt wasn't to intimidate. It was just discharge the 
firearm." R. 4352 (121:11). The trial court then concluded, "I think we can infer 
intimidation from that. The purpose was to discharge the firearm. That's what he said." 
R. 4352 (121:11). Defense counsel added that wt[i|t was early in the morning, as well" 
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and "people were asleep, so you could probably infer that." R. 4352 (121:11). Moa did 
not move to withdraw this guilty plea. See R. 4352. 
The trial court ordered AP&P to prepare a PSR. R. 4352 (73). In his statement for 
the PSR, Moa again admitted that he "got into a car that a firearm was discharged from," 
"failed to stop and lost controle [sic j of my car[,] ran into the curb[,| me and the officer 
both[,] thatj's] when our cars made contact resulting in the agg assault." R. 4352 (PSR: 
4). He said that he was "truely [sic j sorry to the public, my family and everyone that was 
effected [sic) by my actions." R. 4352 (PSR: 4). Then, he said that he planned to "start 
living a positive healthy life," "get back into church," and "go back to school." R. 4352 
(PSR: 4). He said that he has "a family that cares about" him and that he is "going to 
use" his time in prison to learn so that he will "never come back." R. 4352 (PSR: 4). He 
said that he wants to live his life so as to "prove" to himself and his family "that [he] can 
make a change." R. 4352 (PSR: 4). 
The PSR recommended that Moa be sentenced to prison and that "this case run 
consecutive to case no. 3971 and that each count in this case run consecutive." R. 4352 
(PRS:2). It categorized Moa "in the Imprisonment category" because he "lacks 
participation in pro-social events and activities," "could make better use of his time," "is 
currently unemployed and could not provide proof of high school graduation," "has 
clearly shown he is unwilling to comply with the courts [sicj orders as he committed this 
offense while on pretrial release for another drive by shooting," is "currently a fugitive 
from justice from the State of Washington," "does not qualify for DORA because of his 
violent history, previous parole opportunity, and |AP&P's| recommendation for 
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imprisonment," poses "a threat to public safety," "has shown he is not amenable to 
supervision at any level" and "docs not accept any responsibility for any of his actions." 
R. 4352(PSR:2). 
It also provided Moa's criminal history. It said that Moa is "a documented 
member of the Tongan Crip Gang" and "was at one time considered Public Enemy 
Number One." R. 4352 (PSR:6). As a juvenile, he was charged with aggravated assault 
and disorderly conduct, but the disposition is unclear because he failed to appear. R. 
3971 (112:6). His adult history includes multiple misdemeanor charges (several of which 
were ultimately dismissed); felony convictions from Utah for theft, damage to jails, and 
discharging a firearm toward a building (case no. 3971); and felony convictions from 
Washington State for robbery and assault. R. 3971 (112:6-7); 4352 (PSR:5-6). He also 
has an active warrant in Washington State for a parole violation. R. 3971 (112:7). 
In a letter filed on December 5, 2007, Moa asked the trial court to impose his 
sentences concurrently because "I'm changing my life and I'm not comeing [sic] back to 
jail or prison." R. 4352 (86). He said that he was "truly sorry to the public, (his] family 
and all of the people that have been affected from [hisj actions." R. 4352 (86). He said 
that he intends to use his time in prison to learn from his mistakes and to "change [his] 
life for the better." R. 4352 (86). When he is released, he intends to go "back to church 
as soon as |hc| get|s| out." R. 4352 (86). lie also wants to work with troubled youth and 
"start a family of [his| own." R. 4352 (86). 
On January 11, 2008, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. There, defense 
counsel argued: 
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We are asking the Court to not follow the recommendations in the 
presentence report for the consecutive sentences particularly with regard to these 
three counts. We feel that these were a single criminal episode. Mr. Moa has 
expressed remorse in his statement. 1 don't think it's fair to say that he hasn't 
taken responsibility because he did enter a guilty plea to this case. 
And for those reasons, Judge, we'd ask that you consider running this case, 
the three counts here, concurrent with each other even if you want to run it 
consecutive to his other commitment. 
R. 4352 (122:4). Thereafter, counsel submitted the case. R. 4352 (122:6). 
In response, the State asked for consecutive sentencing. R. 4352 (122:5). It 
argued that Moa was "extremely dangerous" and that there were many victims in this 
case because all the citizens in the "whole neighborhood" were victims. R. 4352 (122:6). 
Further, in addition to describing the event that led to the charges in this case, the 
prosecutor described these earlier incidents: 
| T (here was a murder in front of that home in February. One of the bullets went 
into the [) home and hit a young girl in the head. . . . It didn't kill her, luckily. 
Mr. Moa gets released from custody. Within two days, there's a shooting 
again at this home. 
Neighbors come out, there's [sic) some witnesses, not enough to put 
together a case but police are looking for Mr. Moa. 
R. 4352(122:5). 
The trial court then said that it saw "Moa as an extreme danger to any 
community." R. 4352 (122:6). It sentenced Moa to serve three to five years on the 
discharge of a firearm charge, zero to five years on the failure to respond to an officer's 
signal to stop charge, and zero to five years on the aggravated assault charge. R. 4352 
(90-91; 122:6-7). And it ordered the sentences to run "consecutive to each other and all 
consecutive to any other commitment that Mr. Moa might have." R. 4352 (91: 122:7). 
Moa filed a timely notice of appeal. R. 4352 (93-94; 106-12). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
First, this Court should reverse case no. 3971 because the trial court failed 
to strictly comply with the requirements for entry of a guilty plea outlined in rule 
11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 11 says a trial court may not 
accept a guilty plea until it has found that the defendant understands the nature and 
elements of the offense to which the plea is entered and that there is a factual basis 
for the plea. Prior to accepting the guilty plea in this case, the trial court failed to 
determine that Moa understood the nature and elements of the offense or that Moa 
possessed an understanding of the law in relation to the facts. Although these 
arguments are not preserved, this Court should reach them through the plain error 
doctrine or the doctrine of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Second, this Court should reverse case no. 4352 and remand for resentencing 
because the trial court abused its discretion by running Moa\s sentences consecutive to 
each other and to case no. 3971. The Utah Code requires a trial court, when determining 
whether offenses are to run concurrently or consecutively, to consider the gravity and 
circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant. Additionally, due process requires that a judge act 
on reasonably reliable and relevant information in exercising discretion in fixing a 
sentence. In this case, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to properly consider 
the number of victims associated with the crime and by considering information that was 
not reasonably relevant or reliable. These arguments are preserved. Alternatively, this 
Court should reach the merits under rule 22(e) or the plain error doctrine. 
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ARGUMENT 
L THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE CASE NO. 3971 
BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO STRICTLY 
COMPLY WITH RULE 11 WHEN ACCEPTING TLIE 
GUILTY PLEA 
"Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the entry of guilty 
pleas." State v. Corwell, 2005 UT 28,1|11, 114 P.3d 569. It says, in part, that a trial 
court "may not accept" a guilty plea until it has found: 
(e)(2) the pica is voluntarily made; 
(c)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense 
to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden 
of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the pica is 
an admission of all those elements; 
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if 
it establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if 
the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the 
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; . . . 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(2), (4). 
"
c |T|hc substantive goal of rule 11 is to ensure that defendants know of their 
rights and thereby understand the basic consequences of their decision to plead guilty.'" 
Corwell. 2005 UT 28 at *|]11 (citation omitted). 'To accomplish this goal," Utah courts 
"have placed the burden of complying with rule 11(c) on the district courts, requiring 
them to 'personally establish that the defendant's guilty plea is truly knowing and 
voluntary and establish on the record that the defendant knowingly waived his or her 
constitutional rights.'" Id. (citation omitted); see State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 
(Utah 1987). Utah courts "have described this burden 'as a duty of "strict" compliance.'" 
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Corwcll, 2005 UT28at^|ll (citation omitted); see State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d371,372-
73 (Utah 1996). 
"[SJtrict compliance with rule 11(e) does not require that a district court follow a 
'particular script' or any other 'specific method of communicating the rights enumerated 
by rule 11 / " Corwcll, 2005 UT 28 at |^12 (citation omitted); sec State v. Visscr, 2000 UT 
88, ^|11, 22 P.3d 1242. "To the contrary, 'strict compliance can be accomplished by 
multiple means so long as no requirement of the rule is omitted and so long as the record 
reflects the requirement has been fulfilled.'" Corwcll, 2005 UT 28 at |^12 (citation 
omitted). In other words, "the test for whether a trial court strictly complies with rule 
11(e) 'is not whether the court recites the phrases found in that rule. Rather, the test is 
whether the record adequately supports the [trial] court's conclusion that the defendant 
had a conceptual understanding of each of the elements of rule 11(e).'" State v. Hale, 
2006 UT App 434, 2006 WL 2979732 at *1 (alteration in original) (quoting Corwcll, 
2005 UT 28 at ]}l 8), cert, denied, 168 P.3d 339 (Utah 2007). 
"Because strict compliance may be accomplished through a variety of means, the 
question of whether a defendant was provided with a sufficient understanding of rule 
11(c) rights 'necessarily turn|sj on the facts of each case.'" Corwcll, 2005 UT 28 at ^12 
(alteration in original) (citation omitted). In particular, "the district court may base its 
findings on cither the 'questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used,' a plea 
affidavit, 'after the court has established that the defendant has read, understood, and 
acknowledged the contents of the statement.'" Id. (quoting Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)); see 
Thurman, 911 P.2d at 372. "Additionally," it may "base its required findings on the 
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'contents of other documents such as the information, presentence reports, [and] 
exhibits/v Corwcll, 2005 171 28 at f|]12 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
"Moreover, |it| may consider other factors in the record, including the defendant's 
'personal trial experience."' Id. (citation omitted). 
In this case, the trial court failed to strictly comply with rule 11. First, prior to 
accepting the guilty plea, the trial court failed to determine that Moa understood the 
nature and elements of the offense. See supra at Part LA. Second, the trial court failed to 
determine that Moa possessed an understanding of the law in relation to the facts. See 
supra at Part LB. Although these arguments are not preserved, this Court should reach 
them through the plain error doctrine or the doctrine of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
See supra at Parts I.C. and LD. 
A. Prior to Accepting the Guilty Pica, the Trial Court Failed to Determine that 
Moa Understood the Nature and Elements of the Offense. 
Rule 11(e) ''provides that prior to accepting a guilty plea, a trial court must 
determine thai the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense." 
Thurman, 911 P.2d at 372; see Utah R. Crim. P. 11(c)(4)(A). A plea cannot be '"truly 
voluntary" unless the trial court determines that the defendant understands "the nature 
and elements of the offense." In re K.M., 2007 UT 93, T|22, 173 P.3d 1279 (quoting 
Thurman, 911 P.2d at 373); sec Henderson v. Mor&an, 426 U.S. 637, 645 (1976) 
("[C]lcarly the pica could not be voluntary in the sense that it constituted an intelligent 
admission that he committed the offense unless the defendant received 'real notice of the 
true nature of the charge against him, the first and most universally recognized 
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requirement of due process.'" (citations omitted)); Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312 (holding 
that "to make a knowing guilty plea, the defendant must understand the elements of the 
crimes charged . . ."); State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 671 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (same). 
"[T]he factual elements of the charges against the defendant must be explained in 
the taking of a guilty plea so that the defendant understands and admits those elements." 
Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312-13. "Without an adequate communication of the nature and 
elements of the offense that is the subject of the admission, the admission is 
presumptively not knowing and voluntary." K.M., 2007 UT 93 at ^25. 
This Court should reverse because "prior to accepting a guilty plea" in this case, 
the trial court foiled to determine that Moa understood "the nature and elements of the 
offense." Thurman, 911 P.2d at 372; see Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(A). 
Moa pleaded guilty to one count of discharging a firearm toward a building, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(2)(b). In relevant part, 
section 76-10-508 says: 
(l)(a) A person may not discharge any kind of dangerous weapon or 
firearm: 
(i) from an automobile or other vehicle; [or] 
(vii) without written permission to discharge the dangerous weapon from 
the owner or person in charge of the property within 600 feet of: 
(A) a house, dwelling, or any other building; . . . 
(2) A violation of any provision of this section is a class B misdemeanor 
unless the actor discharges a firearm under any of the following 
circumstances not amounting to criminal homicide or attempted criminal 
homicide, in which case it is a third degree felony and the convicted person 
shall be sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of three years in prison: 
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(b) the actor, with intent to intimidate or harass another or with 
intent to damage a habitable structure . . . , discharges a firearm in the 
direction of any building; . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(1 )(a), (2)(b). 
A necessary clement of discharging a firearm toward a building, a third degree 
felony, is that the defendant act "with intent to intimidate or harass another or with intent 
to damage a habitable structure." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(2)(b). If the defendant 
does not act "with intent to intimidate or harass another or with intent to damage a 
habitable structure," then he is not guilty of a third degree felony. IcL Rather, assuming 
that he discharged the weapon intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly and that the 
remaining elements are met, he is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. IdL at § 76-10-
508(1 )(a)(vii), (2); see id at Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (2003) (providing that if a 
statute "does not specify a culpable mental state," then "intent, knowledge, or 
recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility"). 
Nothing in the record, however, indicates that the trial court informed Moa that a 
necessary element of discharging a firearm toward a building, a third degree felony, was 
that he acted "with intent to intimidate or harass another or with intent to damage a 
habitable structure." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10~508(2)(b). 
During the plea colloquy, the nature and elements of the offense were explained 
by defense counsel: "[Apparently on or about the 4th of April 2003 Mr. Moa, as a party, 
intentionally and knowingly discharged a firearm toward a building in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah." R. 3971 (226:6). Supplementing defense counsel's statement, the 
affidavit explained the nature and elements of the offense like this: "On or about 4/4/2003 
22 
defendant as a party intentionally and knowingly discharged a firearm from a vehicle 
toward [buildingf in "SL County State of Utah." R. 3971 (76). 
Beyond the plea colloquy and the plea affidavit, the record shows no other 
documents available to Moa at the time he pleaded guilty that provided a different or 
more comprehensive list of elements. See McCarthy v. United States. 394 U.S. 459, 470 
(1969) ('There is no adequate substitute for demonstrating in the record at the time the 
plea is entered the defendant's understanding of the nature of the charge against him."). 
In particular, the original information charged Moa with an entirely different crime— 
aggravated assault—and gave Moa no warning that he was admitting that he acted "with 
intent to intimidate or harass another or with intent to damage a habitable structure." See 
R. 3971 (1-3). And the amended information (which listed "intent to intimidate or harass 
another or with intent to damage a habitable structure" as a necessary element of the 
offense) was not filed until two and one-half weeks after the change of plea hearing. R. 
3971 (98-100; 226:4-6). 
Thus, as explained to Moa at the time of his guilty plea, the nature and elements of 
the offense were that he: (1) intentionally and knowingly, (2) discharged a firearm, (3) 
toward a building. R. 3971 (76; 226:6). These elements, however, only constitute the 
elements required to prove discharging a firearm, class B misdemeanor. Sec Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-508(l)(a)(vii), (2). They do not constitute the elements required to prove 
discharging a firearm toward a building, a third degree felony. See id. 
Our Legislature has determined that the seriousness of discharging a firearm 
toward a building depends on the defendant's intent. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(1)-
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(2). A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he (1) intentionally, knowingly, or 
recklessly, (2) discharges "any kind of dangerous weapon or firearm," (3) "within 600 
feet of. . . a house, dwelling, or any other building." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
508(1 )(a)(vii), (2); see id. at § 76-2-102. On the other hand, a person is guilty of a far 
more serious crime that amounts to a third degree felony and warrants "an enhanced 
minimum term of three years in prison," ifhe (1) "discharges a firearm in the direction of 
any building," (2) "with intent to intimidate or harass another or with intent to damage a 
habitable structure." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(2)(b). 
In sum, the trial court failed to determine that Moa understood that "intent to 
intimidate or harass another or with intent to damage a habitable structure" was a 
necessary element of the offense. Without this element, the nature and elements of the 
offense described to Moa amounted only to a class B misdemeanor. Thus, this Court 
should reverse because the trial court failed to strictly comply with rule 1 l's requirement 
that the trial court "determine that the defendant understands the nature and elements o[ 
the offense." Thurman, 911 P.2d at 372; see Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(A). 
Upon reversal, this Court should enter a conviction for discharging a firearm, a 
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(l)(a)(vii). 
If... an appellate court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine 
that there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for 
the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to 
support a conviction for an included offense... the verdict or 
judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a 
judgment of conviction entered for the included offense.... 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) (2003). Although the language of this statute does not 
deal explicitly with guilty pleas, the same concept applies because the elements 
established for Moa's guilty plea were insufficient to prove the felony offense but 
sufficient to prove the class B misdemeanor. Sec id. If this Court chooses not to enter a 
conviction for the class B misdemeanor, then it should remand with an order allowing 
Moa to withdraw his guilty plea. See, e.g., K.M., 2007 UT 93 at *|[32 (holding juvenile 
should "be allowed to withdraw her admission" because "her admission was not knowing 
and voluntary" since "juvenile court did not take steps to ensure" that juvenile understood 
"nature and elements of the crime" to which she was admitting before her admission). 
ET, Prior to Accepting the Guilty Plea, the Trial Court Failed to Determine that 
Moa Possessed an Understanding of the Law In Relation to the Facts. 
For a plea to be "truly voluntary," "the trial court must determine that the 
defendant '"possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts.'" Thurman, 
911 P.2d at 373 (quotations and citations omitted); sec Utah R. Crim. P. 11(c)(4)(B) 
(saying trial court "may not accept the plea until [it] has found" that "there is a factual 
basis"); Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312-13 (holding "the factual elements of the charges 
against the defendant must be explained in the taking of a guilty pica so that the 
defendant understands and admits those elements"). As explained by the United States 
Supreme Court in McCarthy: 
[Bjecause a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal 
charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an 
understanding of the law in relation to the facts. . . . 
. . . The judge must determine "that the conduct which the defendant 
admits constitutes the offense charged in the indictment or information or an 
offense included therein to which the defendant has pleaded guilty." . . . 
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. . . There is no adequate substitute for demonstrating in the record at the 
time the plea is entered the defendant's understanding of the nature of the charge 
against him. 
McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466, 467, 470. 
Rule 11 says that "(a| factual basis is sufficient if it establishes that the charged 
crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is 
otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to 
establish a substantial risk of conviction." Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(B). 
In this case, this Court should reverse because the trial court failed to determine 
that Moa w""posscsse[d] an understanding of the law in relation to the facts."' Thurman, 
911 P.2d at 373 (citations omitted). As explained in section I.A., a necessary element of 
discharging a firearm toward a building, a third degree felony, is that the defendant act 
"with intent to intimidate or harass another or with intent to damage a habitable 
structure.'' Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(2)(b). If the defendant does not act "with intent 
to intimidate or harass another or with intent to damage a habitable structure," then, at 
most, he is only guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Id. at § 76-10-508( 1 )(a)(vii), (2). 
At the change of plea hearing. Moa was willing and able to "admit culpability." 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(B). Thus, rule 11 requires the factual basis to "cstablish[| that 
the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant." Id. The trial court, 
however, only determined that Moa understood the nature and elements of the class B 
misdemeanor (not the third degree felony to which he was pleading). See supra at Part 
LA. Likewise, it accepted a factual basis that admitted facts sufficient to prove the class 
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B misdemeanor, but not the crime to which Moa pleaded guilty—discharging a firearm 
toward a building, a third degree felony. 
During the plea colloquy, defense counsel offered the "factual predicate . . . for the 
plea." R. 3971 (226:6). He said that "apparently on or about the 4th of April 2003[,| Mr. 
Moa. as a party, intentionally and knowingly discharged a firearm toward a building in 
Salt Lake County, Slate of Utah." R. 3971 (226:6). This factual basis was supplemented 
by the plea affidavit, which said: "Defendant on the date and time was a party to the 
discharge of firearm within 600 feet of [building] w/out person towards the direction of 
people.^ R. 3971(76). 
The factual basis provided in the plea affidavit is difficult to decipher. See R. 
3971 (76); supra at n.4; Addendum F. Further, once deciphered, it seems, at best, 
confused as to the crime that Moa pleaded guilty to and as to the facts that Moa admitted. 
See R. 3971 (76). In particular, "within 600 feet of [buildingj w/out person" comes from 
the class B misdemeanor charge. Compare R. 3971 (76); with Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
508(1 )(a)(vii)(A). There is no similar language in the statute for the third degree felony. 
Sec Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(2). 
Likewise, "towards the direction of people5' appears to reference the aggravated 
assault allegations in the information. Compare R. 3971 (1-3); with R. 3971 (76). It may 
also reference the offense of discharging a firearm in the direction of a person, a third 
degree felony. Compare R. 3971 (1-3); with Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(2)(a). But, 
after assessing the strength of its case, the State chose not to proceed on charges related 
to people. See R. 3971 (98-100). Indeed, there are several references in the record to the 
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fact that the State had difficulty getting their potential witnesses to appear in court. See 
R. 3971 (234:5,7-8, 15). 
Besides, even if the State had proceeded on charges related to people, the trial 
court failed to determine, as required by rule 11, either that Moa understood the nature 
and elements of those offenses or that he possessed an understanding of those laws in 
relation to the facts. Sec Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (2003) (listing elements of assault 
that include use of "unlawful force or violence" coupled with an attempt or threat "to do 
bodily injury to another," or an act "that causes bodily injury to another or creates a 
substantial risk of bodily injury to another"); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (2003) (listing, 
in addition to the elements required for assault, additional elements of aggravated assault, 
including that the defendant "intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another," or 
"uses a dangerous weapon . . . or other means or force likely to produce death or serious 
bodily injury"); Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(2)(a) (listing as an clement of discharging a 
firearm in the direction of a person that the defendant act "knowing or having reason to 
believe that any person may be endangered"). 
Thus, as related to the discharging a firearm toward a building charge, the facts 
that Moa admitted are: (1) "on or about the 4th of April 2003," (2) he, "intentionally and 
knowingly," (3) "discharged a firearm," (4) "toward a building" or "within 600 feet of 
[building | w/out person" (5) "in Salt Lake County, State of Utah." R. 3971 (76; 226:6). 
These facts, however, do not include any admission of the essential element that Moa 
acted "with intent to intimidate or harass another or with intent to damage a habitable 
structure/' Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(2)(b). 
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Thus, the trial court failed to elicit a factual basis to establish that Moa actually 
committed the offense of discharging a firearm toward a building, a third degree felony. 
Instead, it elicited a factual basis to establish that Moa committed the offense of 
discharging a firearm, a class B misdemeanor. Accordingly, this Court should reverse 
because the trial court failed to strictly comply with rule 11 \s requirement that "the trial 
court must determine that the defendant '"possesses an understanding of the law in 
relation to the facts/" Thurman, 911 P.2d at 373 (citations omitted); see Utah R. Crim. 
P. 11(e)(4)(B). 
Upon reversal, this Court should enter a conviction for discharging a firearm, a 
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(l)(a)(vii). See supra 
at Part LA.: Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) (2003). If this Court chooses not to enter a 
conviction for the class B misdemeanor, then it should remand with an order allowing 
Moa to withdraw his guilty plea. Sec, e.g., K.M., 2007 UT 93 at lf32. 
C. This Court Should Reach the Merits of This Argument Under the Plain Error 
Doctrine. 
aTo demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that '(\) an error exists; (ii) 
the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., 
absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the 
appellant.5" State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, ^ 15, 95 P.3d 276 (citations omitted). In this 
case, this Court should reach the merits of Moa's argument because the trial court 
committed error, the error was obvious, and the error prejudiced Moa. 
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First, as demonstrated above, the trial court erred by failing to strictly comply with 
rule 11 when accepting Moa's guilty plea. See supra at Parts I.A. and LB. Specifically, 
''prior to accepting a guilty plea," the trial court failed to determine that Moa understood 
"the nature and elements of the offense." Thurman, 911 P.2d at 372; see Utah R. Crim. 
P. 11(e)(4)(A). It also failed to determine that Moa "'"possesse[d| an understanding of 
the law in relation to the facts."'" Thurman, 911 P.2d at 373 (citations omitted); sec Utah 
R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(B). 
Second, the error was obvious. "To establish that the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court," Moa "must show that the law governing the error was clear at 
the time the alleged error was made." Dean, 2004 UT 63 at <|]16 (citations omitted). At 
the time of Moa's guilty plea, Utah case law clearly required trial courts to strictly 
comply with rule 11. Hale, 2006 WL 2979732 at *1 (quoting CorweU, 2005 UT 28 at 
U18); see Thurman, 911 P.2d at 372-73; Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312. And Utah case law 
clearly defined strict compliance as ensuring "the defendant had a conceptual 
understanding of each of the elements of rule 11(e)." Hale, 2006 WL 2979732 at * 1 
(quoting Corwell, 2005 UT 28 at ^fl8) (emphasis added); sec Thurman, 911 P.2d at 372-
73; Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312. In particular, Utah case law highlighted two elements as 
necessary to make a plea ""'truly voluntary."'" Thurman, 911 P.2d at 373 (citations 
omitted); sec K.M., 2007 UT 93 at |^22; Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312-13; Stilling, 856 P.2d 
at 671. These two elements—-the trial court must determine that the defendant 
understands "the nature and elements of the offense" and that the defendant "possesses an 
understanding of the law in relation to the facts"—are the elements that were absent from 
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Moa\s guilty plea. Utah R. Crim. P. 1 l(c)(4)(A)-(B): see K.M., 2007 UT 93 at ^[22; 
Thurman, 911 P.2d at 373; Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1312-13; Stilling, 856 P.2d at 671. 
Third, the error was harmful. To establish that the error was harmful, a defendant 
must show that the error "'affected the outcome of the plea process.'5' Dean, 2004 UT 63 
at *|[22 (citation omitted). In other words, to prevail, "establishing harm in the present 
context generally requires the defendant's assertion that 'but for' the alleged error, he or 
she would not have pled guilty." Id (citations omitted). 
In this case, the record establishes that but for the trial court's failure to fully 
explain the elements of the offense to Moa and to elicit a factual basis sufficient to fulfill 
those elements, there is a reasonable likelihood that Moa would not have pleaded guilty. 
The record shows that even without having to admit the more serious allegation that he 
acted "with intent to intimidate or harass another or with intent to damage a habitable 
structure," Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(2)(b), Moa was already feeling concerned about 
entering a guilty plea. R. 3971 (226). During the plea colloquy, he asked the trial court 
questions, including a question about whether he "could get a trial." R. 3971 (226:10). 
In fact, Moa was so concerned about his guilty plea that within three weeks, he 
filed two pro sc motions to withdraw it. R. 3971 (101; 103). In those motions, Moa said 
that he felt "really confused" by the change of plea proceedings and he believed that he 
had received ineffective assistance of counsel. R. 3971 (101; 103). In particular, he 
claimed that the plea bargain presented at the change of plea hearing was harsher than the 
bargain that he believed he was accepting. R. 3971 (101: 103). Although testimony 
provided by third conflict counsel clarified that Moa was informed of the change in the 
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plea bargain, see R. 3971 (227:11-17), his confusion as to the severity of the offense and 
its accompanying punishment suggests that he believed the elements he was admitting 
constituted a less severe offense that it actually did and that if informed of the true 
elements of the offense, he would have better understood the magnitude of the offense 
and rethought his guilty plea. R. 3971 (101; 103). 
Thereafter, in case no. 4352, Moa entered a guilty plea to one count of discharging 
a firearm toward a building, a third degree felony. R. 4352 (73-74; 75-81; 121). At that 
change of plea hearing, the State explained that it was "being thorough on this" case 
because Moa moved to withdraw his guilty plea in case no. 3791. R. 4352 (121:10). 
Accordingly, it finally informed Moa that the offense required "intent to intimidate or 
harass another." R. 4352 (121:10). When presented with this information and asked if 
his intent "was to intimidate somebody." Moa responded, "No," and explained, "It wasn't 
to intimidate. It was just discharge the firearm." 11.4352(121:10-11). Although Moa 
made this statement in regard to another case, it is evidence that he did not understand 
that discharging a firearm toward a building, a third degree felony, required "intent to 
intimidate or harass another or with intent to damage a habitable structure." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-508(2)(b). And, if the trial court had strictly complied with its duty to 
inform Moa of this clement, there is a reasonable likelihood that Moa would not have 
admitted the element or entered the guilty plea. Sec State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371. 375 
(Utah 1996) (holding record "fail[cd| to demonstrate that | defendant| fully comprehended 
the nature and elements of the offense" where defendant acknowledged "that aggravated 
murder by means of a bomb required an intentional or knowing killing," but said "that he 
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did not intend to kill" victim and refused wtto admit that he knew the bomb would cause 
death" (emphasis omitted)). 
Therefore, this Court should reach this issue through the plain error doctrine and 
should reverse because the trial court's failure to determine that Moa understood the 
nature and elements of the offense and that Moa possessed an understanding of the law in 
relation to the facts" was plain error. 
IX This Court Should Reach the Merits of This Argument Under the Doctrine of 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. 
The Sixth Amendment provides a defendant with the right to effective assistance 
of counsel at all stages of the prosecution, including the investigation. Sec State v. Hales, 
2007 UT 14,1|69, 152 P.3d 321. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), uset(s] 
forth the analytical framework for deciding ineffective assistance of counsel claims." 
State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citation omitted). 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under 
the Strickland test, "a defendant must show (1) that counsel's 
performance was so deficient as to fall below an objective 
standard of reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's 
deficient performance there is a reasonable probability that 
the outcome of the trial would have been different" . . . . [I]n 
making this evaluation, the court must "indulge in the strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the 
defendant must overcome the presumption that under the 
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered 
sound trial strategy." 
State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, ^|23, 84 P.3d 1183 (citations omitted). In this case, this 
Court should reach the merits of Moa's argument because defense counsel offered 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
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First, defense counsel provided deficient performance. To prevail on the first 
prong of the Strickland lest, the defendant must show "'that counsel's performance was 
deficient/** State v. Hyrc. 2008 Uf 16.1|16. 179 P.3d 792 (citation omitted). "An 
attorney's performance is deficient if'counsel made errors so serious that counsel was 
not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.'" 
Id. (citation omitted). In other words, "a defendant 'must identify specific acts or 
omissions demonstrating that counsel's representation failed to meet an objective 
standard of reasonableness/" Montoya, 2004 UT 5 at (^24 (citation omitted). 
For example, in State v. Moritzsky, 771 P.2d 688 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), defendant 
argued his counsel was ineffective for providing a defense of habitation instruction that 
did not include "the statutory presumption" of reasonableness. Moritzsky, 771 P.2d at 
692. On appeal, this Court reversed because there was "no tactical explanation for 
requesting a defense of habitation instruction without inclusion of the beneficial 
presumption." Id. Rather, it appeared "counsel merely overlooked the statutory 
presumption by failing to check the cpockel-part' of the Utah Code." Id. 
Likewise, in Eyre, defendant argued his counsel was ineffective for "failing to 
object to the absence of a jury instruction listing the existence of a tax deficiency as an 
clement of tax evasion." Eyre, 2008 UT 16 at ^|18. On appeal, our supreme court held 
for the first time "that proof of a tax deficiency is an clement of Utah's tax evasion 
statute." Id, at ^{10-15. It then reversed for ineffective assistance because "counsel's 
failure to object to a jury instruction that did not alert the jury to every element of the 
crime . . . charged amounted to a deficient performance." Id. at |^ 19. Compare State v. 
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Mahi, 2005 UT App 494, 1fl|19, 21, 125 P.3d 103 (affirming where it was "plausible" that 
counsel "did not accept the judge's offer to give a curative instruction" because "he did 
not want to draw further attention to the testimony"). 
To be effective, counsel must "'adequately investigate the underlying facts' of the 
case because investigation sets the foundation for counsel's strategic decisions about how 
to build the best defense." Hales, 2007 UT 14 at ^69 (citations omitted). 
[Strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts 
relevant to plausible options arc virtually unchallengeable; and 
strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are 
reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional 
judgments support the limitations on investigation. In other words, 
counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a 
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91; see State v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 350, 356 (Utah 1996) 
(holding "'decision not to investigate cannot be considered a tactical decision'" (citation 
omitted)); State v. I Juggins, 920 P.2d 1195, 1199 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (holding 
"'counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision 
that makes particular investigations unnecessary'" (emphasis and citations omitted)); 
State v. Crcstani, 771 P.2d 1085, 1090 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("'[T|he Sixth Amendment 
imposes on counsel a duty to investigate, because reasonably effective assistance must be 
based on professional decisions[,] and informed legal choices can be made only after 
investigation of options.'" (citation omitted)). 
In this case, defense counsel provided deficient representation. It is evident from 
the record that third conflict counsel did not separately investigate the nature and 
elements of the offense or the factual basis. R. 3971 (76; 226:4-6). Rather, he relied 
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entirely on the preparations of second conflict counsel—taking the statement of the 
elements and the factual basis from the plea affidavit rather than from the statute and 
from Moa himself. R. 3971 (76; 226:4-6; 227:11). 
When the trial court asked what Code section contained the discharging a firearm 
toward a building offense, third conflict counsel did not know. R. 3971 (226:4-5). Then, 
when the court asked counsel whether he had explained the deal to Moa, third conflict 
counsel said that he "took over this case after" second conflict counsel "had already 
arranged this and 1 just reiterated it all and have gone over it again with [MoaI." R. 3971 
(226:5). Next, when the trial court asked for the elements and the factual basis, third 
conflict counsel read them directly from the plea affidavit, saying the elements and 
factual basis listed were "apparently" correct because "[tjhat's what is written down here 
as the elements and the facts." R. 3971 (76; 226:6). 
Because third conflict counsel did not separately investigate the nature and 
elements of the offense or the factual basis, he did not realize that "intent to intimidate or 
harass another or with intent to damage a habitable structure" was a necessary clement of 
the offense. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508(2)(b). Accordingly, he was not prepared to 
correct the trial court's error and allowed Moa to enter a guilty plea for a third degree 
felony based on elements and a factual basis that amounted only to a class B 
misdemeanor. See supra at Part l.A. and LB. 
Second, there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome but for 
defense counsel's ineffective assistance. As explained in section I.C., the record 
demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that Moa, if properly informed, would not have 
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admitted that he acted with "intent to intimidate or harass another or with intent to 
damage a habitable structure" and, accordingly, would have decided not to plead guilty. 
Sec supra at Part LC: Dean, 2004 UT 63 at 1122 (holding the "harmfulncss test" for the 
plain error doctrine "is equivalent to the prejudice test applied in assessing claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel" (citation omitted)). 
IL THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE CASE NO. 4352 AND 
REMAND FOR RESENTENCING BECAUSE THE TRIAL 
COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY RUNNING MOA'S 
SENTENCES CONSECUTIVE TO EACH OTHER AND TO 
MOA'S SENTENCE IN CASE NO. 3971 
In this case, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (2003) governed the trial court's decision 
to impose Moa's sentences consecutively. In relevant part, that statute says: 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been 
adjudged guilty of more than one felony offense, whether to 
impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses. 
The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the 
order of judgment and commitment: 
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or 
consecutively to each other; and 
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run 
concurrently or consecutively with any other sentences the 
defendant is already serving. 
(2) In determining whether the state offenses are to run concurrently 
or consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances o[ 
the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (1 )-(2). 
This Court will review the trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion. State v. 
Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1120 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). "An abuse of discretion results when 
the judge "(ails to consider all legally relevant | sentencing | factors/" State v. McCovey, 
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803P.2d 1234? 1235 (Utah 1990) (quoting Slate v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 
1989) (footnote omitted)). 
An abuse of discretion also results "if the sentence imposed exceeds the limits 
prescribed by law/' State v. Scott, 2008 UT App 68,1|6, 180 P.3d 774 (citations 
omitted). In particular, the due process clauses of both the United States and Utah 
Constitutions w"rcquirc| ] that a sentencing judge act on reasonably reliable and relevant 
information in exercising discretion in fixing a sentence."5 State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT 
App 241,1J34, 31 P.3d 615 (quoting State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985)), 
a f fdby, State v. Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, 79 P.3d 937; see State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 
1064, 1071 (Utah 1993) (same); State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985) (same). 
wci
 A sentence in a criminal case should be appropriate for the defendant in light of 
his background and the crime committed and also serve the interests of society which 
underlie the criminal justice system.'" Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241 at [^34 (quoting State 
v. McClendon, 611 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 1980)). Although "The sentencingjudgcf] [has] 
discretion in determining what punishment fits both the crime and the offender," Utah 
courts "have consistently sought To shore up the soundness and reliability of the factual 
basis upon which the judge must rely in the exercise of that sentencing discretion.5" 
Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241 at 1|34 (quoting State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1249 (Utah 
1980)) (alterations in original). 
Thus, a trial court does not have discretion to violate the defendant's due process 
"right to be sentenced based on relevant and reliable information regarding his crime, his 
background, and the interests of society." Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241 at *j[34; sec State 
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v. Sweat, 722 P.2d 746, 746 (Utah 1986) (holding that "so long as basic constitutional 
safeguards of due process and procedural fairness are afforded, the trial court has broad 
discretion in considering 'any and all information that reasonably may bear on the proper 
sentence'" (citation omitted); Lipsky, 608 P.2d at 1248 (holding "fundamental fairness" 
requires that a sentence be based only upon "accurate information"); State v. Sibcrt, 310 
P.2d 388. 393 (Utah 1957) (stating that trial court abuses its discretion ifit bases sentence 
upon "wholly irrelevant, improper or inconsequential consideration"). 
Information that is relevant to sentencing includes information related to the 
defendant's rehabilitation, punishment, incapacitation, restitution, and deterrence. Sec 
State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 634 (Utah 1997) ("'The traditional justifications for 
punishment in the criminal law include retribution, incapacitation, deterrence, and 
rehabilitation.'" (citation omitted)); State v. Sotolonao, 2003 UT App 214,1|5, 73 P.3d 
991 ("Information concerning the appropriate sentence should relate to factors courts 
may consider in making sentencing determinations, including 'rehabilitation,' 
'deterrence, punishment, restitution, and incapacitation.'" (citation omitted)). In addition, 
information that is relevant to "determining whether stale offenses arc to run concurrently 
or consecutively," includes "the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of 
victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Utah Code 
Ann. §76-3-401(2) (2003). 
In this case, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to properly consider the 
"number of victims" associated with the crime and by considering information that was 
not reasonably relevant or reliable. 
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First, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to properly consider the 
number of victims associated with the crime. When the trial court considered the number 
of victims in this case, it improperly considered the State's argument that the "whole 
neighborhood" was a victim of the crime. R. 4352 (122:6). Section 76-3-401 orders that 
a "court shall consider . . . the number of victims" when "determining whether the state 
offenses are to run concurrently or consecutively." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2) 
(emphasis added). When imposing consecutive sentences, then, a trial court abuses its 
discretion if it docs "not properly consider" the number of victims involved. State v. 
Helms. 2002 UT 12,1|16, 40 P.3d 626; see State v. Fere/, 2002 UT App 211, ^ [48, 52 
P.3d 451 (holding "sentencing court must consider all of the statutorily prescribed factors 
for determining whether to impose consecutive sentences"). 
When interpreting a statute, this Court will "'assume the legislature used each 
term advisedly and in accordance with its ordinary meaning." State v. Miller, 2008 UT 
61, ^|18, — P.3d — (citation omitted). In its ordinary meaning, the word "victim" refers 
to an individual person. See Random House, Webster's Unabridged Dictionary, 2119 
(2nd ed. 2001) (defining victim as "a person who suffers from a destructive or injurious 
action or agency"); Black's Law Dictionary, 1598 (8th cd. 1999) (defining victim as "fa| 
person harmed by a crime, tort, or other wrong"). Following this ordinary meaning, our 
Legislature has defined "victim" in the Utah Code as referring to an individual person— 
"'Victim' means a person against whom a crime has allegedly been committed." Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-37-2(3) (2003). Thus, following the ordinary meaning of the term, the 
"number of victims" factor included in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2) refers to the 
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number of w*person[s| against whom a crime has allegedly been committed." Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-37-2(3). It does not refer to society as a whole. Id. Thus, the trial court 
abused its discretion when it considered the State's argument that the "whole 
neighborhood" was a victim of the offense. R. 4352 (122:6). 
Second, the trial court abused its discretion by considering information that was 
not reasonably relevant or reliable. At sentencing, the trial court considered other 
incidents described by the prosecutor: 
[T]here was a murder in front of that home in February. One of the bullets went 
into the |] home and hit a young girl in the head. . . . It didn't kill her, luckily. 
Mr. Moa gets released from custody. Within two days, there's a shooting 
again at this home. 
Neighbors come out, there's some witnesses, not enough to put together a 
case but police are looking for Mr. Moa. 
R. 4352(122:5). 
This information does not represent "relevant and reliable information regarding" 
the gravity and circumstances of Moa's "crime" or Moa's "background." Wanosik, 2001 
UT App 241 at ^34. The shootings described were much more severe than the single 
shooting that Moa was charged with. They involved repetitive targeting of the same 
household and the near death of a "young girl." R. 4352 (122:5). But there is no 
indication in the record that Moa was charged with or convicted of the incidents 
described. See R. 4352. In fact, beyond the State's statement that Moa was "released 
from custody" at the time of one of these prior incidents, there is no indication in the 
record that Moa was even linked to these crimes. R. 4352 (122:5). Because there was no 
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reliable evidence linking these incidents to Moa, they constituted irrelevant and 
unreliable information that should not have been admitted at the sentencing hearing. 
The idea that the "whole neighborhood" was a victim of the offense and the 
recitation of the earlier incidents were both provided by the prosecutor. R. 4352 (122:5-
6). The record does not indicate how heavily the trial court relied on this information 
when it imposed consecutive sentences. R. 4352 (122:6-7). This is because "'Utah law 
does not require sentencing judges to enter specific findings on the record when imposing 
consecutive sentences.5" Helms, 2002 UT 12 at [^17. Instead, if information is provided 
to the trial court during the sentencing hearing or in the PSR, then this Court will hold 
that is "sufficient to 'evidence! | that the trial court did consider" that information. State 
v. Valdez, 2008 UT App 329,1J8, --- P.3d --- (alteration in original) (quoting Helms, 2002 
UT 12 at <|[13). Thus, because the record shows that the State presented these improper 
arguments to the trial court for consideration and the trial court did not reject the 
information as inappropriate for consideration, there is evidence sufficient to show that 
the trial court considered this information in its sentencing decision. Sec id. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse and remand for resentencing because the trial 
court abused its discretion by "'failfing) to consider all legally relevant [sentencing] 
factors/" McCovey, 803 P.2d at 1235 (citation and footnote omitted), and imposing a 
sentence that "exceeds the limits prescribed by law." Scott, 2008 UT App 68 at f|f6 
(citations omitted). 
This issue is preserved because defense counsel asked the trial court to impose 
concurrent, rather than consecutive, sentences. R. 4352 (122:4). Regardless, this Court 
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should still reach its merits under either rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure or the plain error doctrine. Sec State v. Update. 2000 UT 74, [^13. 10 P.3d 
346; supra at Part I.C. 
First, this Court should reach the merits of Moa's argument under rule 22(c). Rule 
22(e) says "[Ijhe court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal 
manner, at any time." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). "The purpose of rule 22(c) is to allow 
correction of manifestly illegal sentences." State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, ^5y 48 P.3d 228 
(footnote omitted). In particular, our supreme court has held that rule 22(e) encompasses 
sentences that violate due process, as Moa argues in this case. See Telford, 2002 UT 51 
at YI12-4 (invoking rule 22(e) to reach the defendant's argument that indeterminate 
sentencing violates Utah's due process clause); see also State v. Garner, 2008 UT App 
32,1HI18-20. 177 P.3d 637 (using rule 22(c) to reach the defendant's "attack on the 
constitutionality of his sentence, and Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme in 
general"). In this case, Moa alleges that his sentence was imposed in an illegal manner 
that violated due process because the trial court relied on information that was not 
reasonably relevant or reliable. See supra al Part II. Thus, this Court should reach the 
merits of Moa's argument under rule 22(e). 
Second, this Court should reach the merits of Moa's argument under the plain 
error doctrine. As explained above, the trial court erred when it considered the "whole 
neighborhood as a victim of the offense and the earlier incidents during sentencing. R. 
4352 (122:5-6). This error was obvious. It was clear at the time of sentencing that the 
"number of victims" factor in section 76-3-401 refers to the number of "person] s| against 
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whom a crime has allegedly been committed." Utah Code Ann. § 77-37-2(3). It does not 
refer to society as a whole. See id. Likewise, it was clear at the time of sentencing that 
the due process clause forbids a sentencing court to rely on information that is not 
"'reasonably reliable and relevant.'" Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241 at |^34 (quoting 
Howell, 707 P.2d at 118), affirmed by, Wanosik 2003 UT 46; see Johnson, 856 P.2d at 
1071 (same); Howell, 707 P.2d at 118 (same). 
This error was also prejudicial. A trial court is statutorily required to consider the 
"number of victims" when deciding whether to impose concurrent or consecutive 
sentences. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2). In this case, the trial court incorrectly 
numbered among the victims of this offense the entire neighborhood. Sec R. 4352 
(122:6). Likewise, the trial court improperly considered the earlier incidents. R. 4352 
(122:5). These incidents were more serious than the present case because they created a 
sense that Moa was repeatedly targeting the same house and that Moa had been involved 
in a shooting that nearly killed a "young girl." R. 4352 (122:5). But for the prejudicial 
impact of these errors (both individually and collectively), there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the trial court would have run at least some of the sentences concurrently. 
This is particularly true given the following information about Moa's history, 
character, and rehabilitative needs: Moa accepted responsibility for his actions by 
pleading guilty and by not later moving to withdraw his guilty plea, R. 4352 (73-74; 75-
81; 121); Moa said in his statement for the PSR that he was "truly sorry" for his actions, 
that he planned to ''start living a positive healthy life," "get back into church," and "go 
back to school," and that he was "going to use" his time in prison to learn so that he 
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would "'never come back" to prison, R. 4352 (PSR: 4); and Moa reiterated in his 
December 5, 2007, letter that he was sorry for his actions and said that he was determined 
to use his time in prison to learn from his mistakes, to "change [his| life for the better," 
and to make it so that he can return to church, work with troubled youth, and start a 
family of his own when he is released from prison. R. 4352 (86). 
The trial court was required to consider Moa's history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs when imposing consecutive sentences. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
401(2). Considering Moa's contrite attitude and desire to be rehabilitated, there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the trial court would have imposed concurrent sentences but 
for the prejudicial impact of its errors. For these reasons, this Court should reach the 
merits of Moa's argument and reverse and remand for resentencing. 
CONCLUSION 
In case 3971, this Court should reverse the trial court's decision to deny Moa's 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. It should then impose a conviction for discharging a 
firearm, a class B misdemeanor, or remand with an order allowing Moa to withdraw his 
guilty plea. In case 4352, this Court should remand for resentencing. 
SUBMITTED this Q\__ day of October, 2008. 
,ORI J. SEPPI r *^ L 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Charles Moa, 
Defendant and Appellant 
ORDER 
Case No. 20070940-CA 
Case No. 20080153-CA 
This matter is before the court upon Appellant !s motion to 
consolidate the above cases. Appellee did not oppose the motion. 
It appears that judicial economy will result by consolidating 
the appeals for a single determination. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 
that the above appeals are consolidated as Case No. 20070940-CA. 
All future filings shall be filed under Case No. 20070940-CA. 
Dated this 
FOR THE COURT: 
T day of May, 2008. 
/-
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Presiding Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on May 7, 2008, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail or 
placed in Interdepartmental mailing to be delivered to: 
LORI J SEPPI 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 E 500 S STE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
J FREDERIC VOROS JR 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E 300 S 6TH FL 
PO BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE 
450 S STATE ST 
PO BOX 18 60 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860 
Dated this May 7, 2008. 
By 
Deputy Cle 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHARLES MOA, 
Defendant« 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No; 031903971 FS 
Judge: TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
Date: October 29, 2007 
PRESENT 
Clerk: cheril 
Prosecutor: TORRIENTE, SEAN M 
Defendant 
Defendant]s Attorney(s); LJUNGBBRG, ROBIN K 
Agency: Adult Probation & Parole 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: May 3, 1979 
Video 
Tape Number: DVR W3 7 Tape Count: 11;54 05 
CHARGES 
1. DISCHARGING FIREARM FROM VEH/HWY (amended) ~ 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea; Guilty - Disposition: 05/25/2007 No Contest 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISCHARGING FIREARM FROM 
VEH/HWY a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term from 3 to 5 years in the Utah State Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
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JAN-14-2008 MON 03:43 ?\* ^ d DISTRICT COURT FAX NO, Pn12387404 P. 02 
Case No: 031903971 
Date; Oct 29, 2007 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
148 Days credit time served is recommended. 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $1000.00 
Suspended: $0,00 
Surcharge; $850.00 
Due: $1850.00 
Total Fine: $1000.00 
Total Suspended: $0 
Total Surcharge: $850.00 
Total Principal Due: $1850 
Plus Interest 
Fine payments are to be made to Board of Pardons Court. Fane payments are to be made to B 
Dated this p 7 day of f^rldU^ , 2 0^QZ 
TIMOTHY R-. 
District -Cou 
By v ^ ; f );••;••; •„!• 
STAMP-USED'AT DIRECTION OF JUDGE 
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MAR-17-2008 MON 12:39 PM I DISTRICT COURT FAX NO. f ^387404 P. 04 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : MINUTES 
Plaintiff, : SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
VS. : Cape NO: 071904352 FS 
CHARLES MOA, : Judge: STEPHEN L HENRIOD 
Defendant. : Date: January 11, 2008 
PRESENT 
Clerk; mckaem 
Prosecutor: TGRRIENTE, SEAN M 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LJUNGBERG, ROBIN K 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth; May 3, 1975 
Audio 
Tape Number: 1-08 Tape Count: 9:25 
CHARGES 
1, DISCHARGING FIREARM FROM VEH/HWY - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 11/13/2007 Guilty 
8. FAIL TO STOP/RESPOND AT COMMAND OF POLIC - 3rd Degree Felony . 
Plea; Guilty - Disposition: 11/13/2007 Guilty 
9- AGGRAVATED ASSAULT - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition; 11/13/2007 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISCHARGING FIREARM FROM 
VEH/HWY a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term from 3 to 5 years in the Utah State Prison, 
Based on the defendant's conviction of FAIL TO STOP/RESPOND AT 
COMMAND OF POLIC a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to 
an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 3rd 
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MAR-17-2008 MON 12:39 PM i DISTRICT COURT FAX NO. 2387404 P. 05 
Case No: 071904352 
Date: Jan 11, 2008 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison, 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff; The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Counts are consecutive to each other and consecutive to any other 
commitments that defendant is currently serving 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $1000.00 
Suspended: $0.00 
Surcharge; $472.97 
Due: $1000.00 
Charge # 8 
Charge # 9 
Total Fine 
Total Suspended 
Total Surcharge 
Total Principal Due 
Attorney Fees 
Pay in behalf of: 
$1000.00 
$0 
$472.97 
$1000.00 
Plus Interest 
Amount: $350.00 Plus Interest 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEYS 
Restitution to be left open for 120 days 
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Case No: 071904352 
Date : J a n 1 1 , 2008 
Defendant p r e s e n t from USP 
Dated t h i s 1 ^ day of 
STAMP USED 
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U. S. Constitution Amendment XIV 
Amendment 14 - Citizenship Rights. Ratified 7/9/1868. 
1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their 
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding 
Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for 
President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the 
Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is 
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and 
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, 
or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State. 
3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and 
Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any 
State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of 
the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial 
officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged 
in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts 
incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or 
rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall 
assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against 
the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such 
debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of 
this article. 
Utah Constitution Article I, Section VII 
Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.J 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (2003) 
Separate offenses arising out of single criminal episode — Included offenses. 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate offenses 
arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act of a defendant 
under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be punished in 
different ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be punishable under 
only one such provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under any such provision 
bars a 76-1-402 prosecution under any other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal episode, 
unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant shall not be subject to 
separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the defendant is 
arraigned on the first information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but may 
not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense. An offense is so 
included when: 
(a) I t is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish 
the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit 
the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included offense 
unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense 
charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate court on 
appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence to support a 
conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to support a 
conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact necessarily found every fact 
required for conviction of that included offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may 
be set aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for the included offense, 
without necessity of a new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant. 
History: C. 1953, 76-1-402, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-402; 1974, ch. 32, § 2. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (2003) 
76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences — Limitations — Definition. 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one 
felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses. 
The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the order of judgment and 
commitment: 
(a) if the sentences imposed arc to run concurrently or consecutively to each other; 
and 
(b) if the sentences before the court arc to run concurrently or consecutively with any 
other sentences the defendant is already serving. 
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecutively, the 
court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, 
and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if the later 
offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, unless the court 
finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing would be inappropriate. 
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences arc 
to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall request 
clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall enter a clarified 
order of commitment stating whether the sentences arc to run consecutively or 
concurrently. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single 
criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all 
sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as provided under 
Subsection (6)(b). 
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if: 
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death penalty or a 
maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or 
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which occurs 
after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed. 
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were 
committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present sentencing 
court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to 
the present offense did not occur after his initial sentencing by any other court. 
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of 
consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of 
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Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been committed for a single 
term that consists of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the maximum 
sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any, 
constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the 
other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that provides the longer 
remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of individual 
consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of any sentence so 
imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually served under the commitments. 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to impose 
consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a secure 
correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not been terminated 
or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where the person is located. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508 (Supp. 2007) 
76-10-508. Discharge of firearm from a vehicle, near a highway, or in direction of 
any person, building, or vehicle—Penalties 
(l)(a) A person may not discharge any kind of dangerous weapon or firearm: 
(i) from an automobile or other vehicle; 
(ii) from, upon, or across any highway; 
(iii) at any road signs placed upon any highways of the state; 
(iv) at any communications equipment or property of public utilities including 
facilities, lines, poles, or devices of transmission or distribution; 
(v) at railroad equipment or facilities including any sign or signal; 
(vi) within Utah State Park buildings, designated camp or picnic sites, overlooks, 
golf courses, boat ramps, and developed beaches; or 
(vii) without written permission to discharge the dangerous weapon from the 
owner or person in charge of the property within 600 feet of: 
(A) a house, dwelling, or any other building; or 
(B) any structure in which a domestic animal is kept or fed, including a barn, 
poultry yard, corral, feeding pen, or stockyard. 
(b) It shall be a defense to any charge for violating this section that the person 
being accused had actual permission of the owner or person in charge of the 
property at the time in question. 
(2) A violation of any provision of this section is a class B misdemeanor unless the 
actor discharges a firearm under any of the following circumstances not 
amounting to criminal homicide or attempted criminal homicide, in which case it 
is a third degree felony and the convicted person shall be sentenced to an enhanced 
minimum term of three years in prison: 
(a) the actor discharges a firearm in the direction of any person or persons, 
knowing or having reason to believe that any person may be endangered; 
(b) the actor, with intent to intimidate or harass another or with intent to damage a 
habitable structure as defined in Subsection 76-6-101(2), discharges a firearm in 
the direction of any building; or 
(c) the actor, with intent to intimidcite or harass another, discharges a firearm in the 
direction of any vehicle. 
(3) The court shall: 
(a) notify the Driver License Division of the conviction for purposes of any 
revocation, denial, suspension, or disqualification of a driver license under Section 
53-3-2200 )(a)(xi); and 
(b) specify in court at the time of sentencing the length of the revocation under 
Subsection 53-3-225(l)(c). 
(4) This section does not apply to a person: 
(a) who discharges any kind of firearm when that person is in lawful defense of 
self or others; or 
(b) who is performing official duties as provided in Sections 23-20-1.5 and 76-10-
523 and as otherwise provided by law. 
Laws 1973, c. 196. § 76-10-508; Laws 1990. c. 328. § 3; Laws 1992. c. 99. § 1; 
Laws 1995. c. 23. § 2. eff. May 1. 1995; Laws 1999. c. 295. § 1. eff. May 3. 1999; 
Laws 2000. c. 214. § 6. eff. March 14. 2000; Laws 2005. c. 220. § 12. eff. July 1. 
2005. 
<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables> 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Laws 2005. c. 220, inserted subsec. (3) and redesignated former subsec. (3) as (4). 
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Utah R. Crim. P. 11(2008) 
Rule 11. Pleas. 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented by 
counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The defendant shall not be 
required to plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason of 
insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty or 
not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant 
corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court. 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be set for 
trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an early trial. In 
cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or counsel, of the 
requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally 
ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived 
the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right 
against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before an 
impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution 
witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering 
the plea, these rights are waived; 
(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which 
the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each 
of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all 
those elements; 
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it 
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or, if the 
defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the prosecution has 
sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction; 
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(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if applicable, 
the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each 
offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the imposition of 
consecutive sentences; 
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and 
if so, what agreement has been reached; 
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw the plea; and 
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited. 
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, 
a written statement reciting these factors after the court has established that the defendant 
has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the statement. If the defendant 
cannot understand the Finglish language, it will be sufficient that the statement has been 
read or translated to the defendant. 
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire into or 
advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea. 
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to withdraw 
a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea 
aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make a motion under Section 77-
13-6. 
(g) If the defendant pleads guilty, no contest, or guilty and mentally ill to a 
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, as defined in Utah Code Section 77-36-1, the 
court shall advise the defendant orally or in writing that, as a result of the plea, it is 
unlawful for the defendant to possess, receive or transport any firearm or ammunition. 
The failure to advise does not render the plea invalid or form the basis for withdrawal of 
the plea. 
(h)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has agreed to 
request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the 
dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved or rejected by the court. 
(h)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall advise 
the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the 
court. 
(i)(l)The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea agreement 
being made by the prosecuting attorney. 
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(i)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon request of 
the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in 
advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting 
attorney and defense counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved. 
(i)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in conformity with 
the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant 
to cither affirm or withdraw the pica. 
(j) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may 
enter a conditional pica of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the 
record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of the adverse determination of 
any specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to 
withdraw the plea. 
(k) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to the other 
requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to 
determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 77- 16a-
103. 
(1) Compliance with this rule shall be determined by examining the record as a whole. 
Any variance from the procedures required by this rule which docs not affect substantial 
rights shall be disregarded. Failure to comply with this rule is not, by itself, sufficient 
grounds for a collateral attack on a guilty plea. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHARLES MOA, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 031903971 FS 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - APRIL 25, 2007 
JUDGE JOHN PAUL KENNEDY PRESIDING 
For the Plaintiff: VINCENT B. MEISTER 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
MR. MEISTER: Judge, we do have a resolution in 
this case after all. 
THE COURT: Let's go on the record. We're here in 
the matter of State of Utah. vs. Charles Moa. Counsel do you 
want to state your appearance? 
MR. GARCIA: Manny Garcia for the defendant, Your 
Honor. 
MR. MEISTER: Vincent Meister for the State. 
THE COURT: You think you've been able to work out 
some sort of a resolution in this matter you say? 
MR. GARCIA: With the Court's approval, yes. 
THE COURT: Why don't you tell us what the 
resolution is? 
MR. MEISTER: The resolution is the defendant will 
plead guilty to Discharge of a Firearm, 3rd Degree Felony. 
As part of the resolution the agreement would be that he 
would be released today. The State is recommending probation 
in this case but what the defendant has to realize is should 
1 the Court release him today and Court orders a presentence 
2 report, should he not go get his presentence report, should 
3 he have any violations of the criminal laws of this state or 
4 any other state between now and the time of the sentencing, 
5 the probationary recommendation for sentencing goes away and 
6 we would be recommending incarceration at the Utah State 
7 Prison. 
8 MR. GARCIA: That's our understanding. 
9 Is that your understanding, Charles? 
10 MR. MOA: Yes. 
11 MR. GARCIA: Stand up and come over here. Thank 
12 you. 
13 THE COURT: So as I understand what you said is he 
14 will be pleading guilty to a 3rd Degree Felony, Unlawful 
15 Discharge of a Firearm. 
16 MR. GARCIA: Toward a building, yes. 
17 THE COURT: Toward a building and the other charges 
18 will be dismissed; is that correct? 
19 MR. MEISTER: Yes. 
20 THE COURT: And then Mr. Moa will be released 
21 today. He will report to AP&P at a time indicated by the 
22 Court, probably within 12 hours after his release. 
23 MR. GARCIA: Okay. 
24 THE COURT: If he's released later this afternoon 
25 that might not be until Monday or Tuesday because I think 
Monday is a holiday. 
MR. GARCIA: In reality, Judge, he won't be 
released this morning, right? It'll take at least until this 
afternoon, probably toward the end of the day. 
THE COURT: I would expect so. You're talking 
about reporting to AP&P say by noon on Tuesday. 
MR. GARCIA: Monday is a holiday so you be there by 
Tuesday at noon? 
MR. MOA: I'll be there. 
THE COURT: And there won't be any excuses. I mean 
if you've got car trouble or if you're sick or whatever, 
you've got to get over there by noon on Tuesday. If you 
comply with that condition together with any other conditions 
that may be imposed by AP&P you will then face a sentencing 
hearing. We'll get you a date for that with the assigned 
judge and then if there are any further problems and either 
failures to follow AP&P's instructions or violations of the 
law that take place between now and the time of your 
sentencing, the recommendation of probation which the State 
is now willing to make will go away and you they will not 
recommend that and the judge then may sentence you to prison. 
Do you understand all of that? 
MR. MOA: So any, like just being late to check in, 
that right there is (inaudible) prison? 
MR. GARCIA: If it's not your fault, if you're 
1 making a good faith effort you're okay. 
2 THE COURT: Usually AP&P will work with you but you 
3 need to comply in good faith with their requirements and if 
4 you have a problem, let them know about it before rather than 
5 after, okay? 
6 MR. MOA: Okay. 
7 THE COURT: Do you understand all of that? 
8 MR. MOA: I understand. 
9 MR. MEISTER: As part of the conditions, Judge, I 
10 Relieve is that he will be released to pretrial services and 
11 if they weren't willing to take him before, we're agreeing 
12 with that. Part of those conditions are the gang conditions. 
13 He's got 23 conditions that pretrial and defense counsel is 
14 aware of and we would just — 
15 MR. GARCIA: (Inaudible). Again, if it's not a 
16 problem it shouldn't be a problem, okay? 
17 THE COURT: Okay. So counsel are you willing to 
18 waive any objection to making the changes on the information 
19 by interlineation? 
20 MR. GARCIA: No objection, Your Honor. 
21 MR. MEISTER: Ki\d for tYvs. record, ^^ will submit to 
22 the Court the amended information reflecting the new charge. 
23 THE COURT: All right. What section will he be 
24 charged under, do you know? 
25 MR. MEISTER: Section 76-10, I believe it's 508, 
1 isn't it counsel? 
2 MR. GARCIA: I honestly don't know. I looked at it 
3 a few days ago and I did not write it down, Judge. 
4 THE COURT: Why don't you come up and tell me what 
5 that will be* 
6 MR. MEISTER: It is 76-10-508. 
7 THE COURT: All right, counsel, you've agreed to 
8 waive this interlineation, accept the amended information. 
9 MR. GARCIA: Charles, what he's saying is he's 
10 going to amend the information of what it was to what it is 
11 now by just writing in rather than having the DA file a new 
12 information. Are you okay with that? 
13 MR. MOA: Yes. 
14 THE COURT: That's this morning. The prosecution 
15 has indicated they will file an amended information that will 
16 actually set forth this particular section. But for today 
17 we're just doing it by my writing it in, okay? Now, you've 
18 had a chance to explain all of this to your client? 
19 MR. GARCIA: Yes, Your Honor, and in fact I took 
20 over this case after Mr. — 
21 THE COURT: I understand. 
22 MR. GARCIA: - Valdez had already arranged this and 
23 I just reiterated it all and have gone over it again with 
24 Charles and I believe that this is our understanding of the 
25 deal, right? 
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MOA: Yes, yeah. 
GARCIA: Okay. 
COURT: Okay. So Mr. Moa, today are you under 
of any drugs or alcohol or any like substance? 
MOA: No. 
COURT: You're not receiving treatment for any 
physical or mental problem of any kind? 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MOA: No, Your Honor. 
COURT: You're feeling good today? 
MOA: I'm feeling (inaudible). 
COURT: And you're thinking clearly? 
MR. MOA: Thinking clearly. 
THE COURT: How much education do you have? 
MR. MOA: I have my GED. 
THE COURT: Okay. Now, counsel, do you want to 
state what the factual predicate for this charge is and for 
the plea? 
MR. GARCIA: Judge, apparently on or about the 4th 
of April 2003 Mr. Moa, as a party, intentionally and 
knowingly discharged a firearm toward a building in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. That's what is written down here as 
the element and the facts, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Is that what happened, Mr. Moa? 
MR. MOA: Yes, (inaudible). 
THE COURT: You don't have to plead guilty today. 
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You could plead not guilty. If you plead not guilty you'd be 
entitled to a speedy public trial before a fair, unbiased, 
impartial jury. The only way you could be convicted would be 
if the State met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt all of the elements of the offense just outlined by 
your attorney. At the trial and the proceedings you'd have a 
right to be represented by counsel. If you couldn't afford a 
lawyer, the Court appoints one for you. You and your lawyer 
would have the right to confront and cross examine witnesses 
at the trial, you'd also have the right to bring in witnesses 
to testify in your behalf if you wanted to do that. If you 
couldn't afford that cost, the State would pay that cost. 
You can even testify yourself if you wanted to but you 
couldn't be forced to testify or incriminate yourself in 
anyway and if you chose not to do that, it couldn't be used 
again you. If you didn't want to testify, that couldn't be 
used against you in any way, do you understand that? 
MR. MOA: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. If you were convicted by a 
unanimous jury - it will take a unanimous jury to convict you 
- you would still have the right to appeal to higher courts. 
Do you understand those rights? 
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1 those rights with respect to this case and you're going to be 
2 admitting you committed that offense. Is that really what 
3 you want to do? 
4 MR. GARCIA: Your Honor, the arrangement was that 
5 he plead no contest. 
6 And Charles, if you don't understand, a no contest 
7 plea is still treated as a guilty plea here but what it means 
8 if that you are not admitting anything, you're not denying 
9 anything, but you're allowing the Court to treat it as a 
10 guilty plea. You're admitting there's enough evidence for 
11 you to be convicted if the evidence was believed. So you 
12 would basically be no contesting it, saying that you're not 
13 contesting it but you're allowing the deal for purposes of 
14 resolving this matter. 
15 THE COURT: I didn't understand that. 
16 MR. GARCIA: I'm sorry, I didn't tell you that in -
17 THE COURT: Does the State consent to the no 
18 contest plea? 
19 MR. MEISTER: That's fine, Your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: All right. The State has to consent if 
21 you're going to do that. So, all right. In this instance if 
22 you enter a no contest plea you will in effect be giving up 
23 your right to defend yourself at the trial and the Court will 
24 be able to enter a conviction on the basis of your no contest 
25 I plea, do you understand that? 
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1 MR. MOA: I understand that. 
2 THE COURT: Now a 3rd Degree Felony in Utah is 
3 punishable by zero to five years in the state prison. 
4 There's also a fine possible of up to $5,000 plus an 85 
5 percent surcharge on top of that. 
6 MR. GARCIA: Excuse me Your Honor, did you say this 
7 is a three to five? 
8 MR. MEISTER: Because it's a discharge, it's three 
9 to five. 
10 THE COURT: Three ro five, thank you, I'm 
11 corrected. So instead of zero to five, it's three years to 
12 five years, state prison, do you understand that? 
13 MR. MOA: Yes. 
14 THE COURT: And you understand the part that I said 
15 about potential fine that could be assessed against you? 
16 MR. MOA: Yes. 
17 THE COURT: All right. Now, we've talked about 
18 what the State's recommendation is at this point given your 
19 current status and as I understand it, they will, at the time 
20 of sentencing they plan today to recommend probation. That's 
21 based and conditioned however, as I understand it, upon your 
22 cooperating fully and in good faith with AP&P and also not 
23 having any further charges filed against you. Do you 
24 understand that? 
25 MR. MOA: That's fine. 
1 THE COURT: Do you have any questions that you want 
2 to ask the Court today? 
3 MR. MOA: Ummm, I just wanted to ask if I wasn't 
4 convicted is there anyway I can get, like you said, I could 
5 get a trial or whatever? 
6 THE COURT: If you didn't take the plea today, my 
7 understanding is that the State would proceed to a 
8 preliminary hearing and if there's probable cause to believe, 
9 which is a very low standard, that the crime was committed 
10 and that you were involved in committing the crime, you could 
11 be facing a trial on three 2nd Degree Felonies of Aggravated 
12 Assault. If you were convicted in that context, aggravated 
13 assault is, in this case, it would be 3 to 15 and so you 
14 might be looking at, it could be sentenced one after the 
15 other, you could be looking at 45 years. So, you have that 
16 choice and your lawyer has attempted to work out something to 
17 your benefit and so that's - I mean, I'm not going to force 
18 you to do what he's recommended today and you have to make 
19 that decision. 
20 MR. MOA: (Inaudible) follow his advice. 
21 THE COURT: Okay, so do you have any questions you 
22 want to ask him that you haven't had a chance to ask and we 
23 can let you talk in private if you need to or... 
24 MR. MOA: No, I just wanted to make sure there 
25 I would be no other prosecution after this. That's all I 
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1 wanted to know. 
2 .THE COURT: The only thing I can tell you is if you 
3 don't commit any more crimes or any additional crimes — 
4 MR. GARCIA: There shouldn't be. 
5 THE COURT: There shouldn't be -
6 MR. MOA: Just in this case. 
7 MR. MEISTER: I would just reiterate, Judge, 
8 because as far as this episode and he's pleading on that, 
9 legally we can't charge you with other crimes. 
10 MR. MOA: People been telling me that - all this... 
11 MR. GARCIA: Do you want me to sign this statement? 
12 THE COURT: Mr. Moa, before we go on I just want to 
13 make sure, other than what we've talked about here in court 
14 today, has anyone promised you anything to get you to pled no 
15 contest to this charge? 
16 MR. MOA: No. 
17 THE COURT: Is anyone forcing you or pushing you 
18 into this? 
19 MR. MOA: No. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. There's a plea agreement that 
21 has been set before you. If you wish to sign that, you may 
22 go ahead and sign it and if you do I will endorse the 
23 document and place it into the file as part of the record. 
24 MR. MOA: (inaudible) Monday? 
25 J MR. GARCIA: So Monday is a holiday, Tuesday by 
11 
1 noon. You go in there Tuesday morning no matter what and do 
2 your report, no excuse. 
3 THE COURT: I have signed it and put it in the 
4 file. You have the right to be sentenced in no less than two 
5 days not more than 45 days. What will happen is you'll go in 
6 and report. They will begin the process of preparing a 
7 review and a report about you and a recommendation as to what 
8 kind of sentence the Court ought to impose. Noting the 
9 recommendation from the State and anything that you want to 
10 tell them, at the time of sentencing you'll get a chance to 
11 speak to the judge. Your lawyer will also get a chance to 
12 speak to the judge. The prosecution can speak and if there's 
13 some victims, they're given a chance to talk and then the 
14 judge, after hearing all that and reviewing the report and 
15 hearing the recommendation of the State, will issue a 
16 sentence. Now, I should point out to you that the courts are 
17 never required to follow anybody's recommendation. You should 
18 be aware of that. Do you understand that? 
19 MR. MOA: Yes, I understand. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. All right. What date can we 
21 have for sentencing here? 
22 COURT CLERK: July 16, 9:00 Judge Maughan. 
23 MR. GARCIA: I'm sorry, that's a bad day for me. 
24 I've got to be at the prison that morning. Can we go just 
25 I one more week? 
12 
1 THE COURT: The 23rd? 
2 MR. GARCIA: Uh~huh (affirmative). Same judge? 
3 COURT CLERK: Yes, same time. 
4 MR. GARCIA: Nine o'clock, Judge Maughan? 
5 THE COURT: That's a little bit longer than the 45 
6 days. Do you waive that time? 
7 MR. GARCIA: You have a right to be sentenced with 
8 4 5 days, do you waive that? 
9 MR. MOA: Yes. 
10 THE COURT: That'll give AP&P plenty of time. All 
11 right. Now, based on the motion of the State, without 
12 objection I'm going to dismiss the other counts and you will 
13 have a date then on Tuesday with AP&P before noon and then 
14 another date on the 23rd of July in front of Judge Maughan. 
15 MR. MEISTER: I would like the docket to reflect or 
16 his paperwork to reflect that the pretrial services will be 
17 supervising him and the (inaudible). Thank you. 
18 THE COURT: The Court will so order pretrial 
19 supervision and then there's normal provisions plus any gang 
20 provisions will be applied. Whether or not you're a member 
21 of a gang, those provisions will be in effect and you need to 
22 comply with them, they'll explain those to you. Now, whose 
23 going to get me the kick-out order so he gets out today? 
24 MR. GARCIA: I can prepare one and get it to the 
25 I Court. 
13 
THE COURT: If you would. 
MR. GARCIA: As soon as I can this morning. 
MR. MEISTER: I'll try to get you the copy of those 
if you want to follow me to the court, I'll get you a copy of 
those conditions that (inaudible). 
THE COURT: . Can you help him Rosie, put that 
(inaudible) his pocket. Put it in his pocket so he doesn't 
drop it. Thank you. 
Any questions at this point by you, Mr. Moa? 
MR. MOA: So I'll be released today for sure? 
THE COURT: Well, your lawyer is going to get me an 
order to sign. I will sign the order, it'll go over to the 
jail and at that point you can yell at the sheriff's 
personnel because they're in charge of the jail, all right. 
MR. GARCIA: You need to call me Tuesday and let me 
know you did this. 
MR. MOA: I'll call you. 
MR. GARCIA: Call me Tuesday and say, I'm at AP&P 
(inaudible) that this happened so there's no problem. I'll 
get the order to the Judge's clerk in about an hour. I've 
got another hearing, I've got to go to the office and prepare 
and I'll get it back right over here. Okay? 
MR. MOA: Another thing, Your Honor, the prosecutor 
said something about some conditions. Is he going to.write 
up something? 
• • • : . ' . ' . . ' • 1 4 
1 THE COURT: AP&P will tell you what the conditions 
2 are. 
3 MR. MOA: Is he going to write some stuff up 
4 (inaudible) 
5 THE COURT: You can ask them for it in writing if 
6 you want them in writing. You'll get those Tuesday. 
7 I MR. MOA: Thank you. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA 
Plaintiff, : AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
vs. : Case No. 6^> /?<Q l£r 7 / 
Defendant. J^f. [ fC_a-t^-T^vfl-^ 
I CM^U, M 0^. hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been 
advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights: 
Notification of Charges 
I am pleading guilty (ofr no coiitestj^the following crimes: 
Crime & Statutory Degree Punishment 
Provision Min/Max and/or 
") J Mmhnum Mandatory 
Zh>^J^r^ f2X^^ J^S~p< J^^jL^ 
c. ~7W 
I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or 
had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am 
pleading guilty (or no contest). 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are: 
O-o 
4-^-
L/pl^-^fSi^^v-v 
C<^L^ 1 2 
<z- MHJ: 
UFT] 
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes 
listed above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, T am not contesting that I committed the 
foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or 
contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for 
which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty 
(or no contest) pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or 
no contest): 
^ " - " t ^ j ^ C^-^^J^K. 
JsCg? 3>^^^Jh^ Ch QLJLjcrnJlfi 
^zxt^J&^fcs 
Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights 
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead 
guilty (or no contest) I will give up all the following rights: 
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I 
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand 
-iip 
that I might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed 
lawyer's service to me. 
I (have not) (have) waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right to counsel, 
I have done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons: 
If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that 
I understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty 
(or no contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the 
consequences of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is >r-kl4M&<L 
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of 
my guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial 
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest). 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that if I were to have a 
trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and 
b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to 
cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me. 
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a trial, I could call witnesses 
if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony 
of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State would 
pay those costs. 
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to 
have a trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf I also know that if I chose 
not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself I also 
know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal 
to testify against me. 
Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that if I do not plead guilty 
(or no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged 
crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty," and my 
case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each 
3 n 
element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict 
must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty (or^no contest, I give up the presumption of 
innocence and will be admitting that I committed tlie^crime(s) stated above. 
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or 
judge, I would have tlie right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford tlie 
costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up 
my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest). I understand that if I wish 
to appeal my sentence I must file a notice of appeal within 30 days after my sentence is 
entered. 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up ail the 
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above. 
Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea 
Potential penalties. I know the rmjxiixmm sentence that may be imposed for each 
crime to which I am pleading guilty (ofno contest)> I know that by pleading guilty (or no 
contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving 
a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or 
both. 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be 
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my 
crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of 
a plea agreement. 
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime 
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run 
at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each 
crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing 
on another offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no 
contest), my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being 
imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was 
imprisoned or on parole, 1 know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences would be 
inappropriate. 
4 
Plea agreement My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) (is/are) (is/are not) the result of 
a plea agreement between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and 
provisions of the plea agreement, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those 
explained below: 
^e^ ft^ **^< 
Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges 
for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not 
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they 
believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge. 
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, or unlawful 
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises 
except those contained in this statement have been made to me. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I 
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to 
change or delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes 
because all of the statements are correct. 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
I am _ years of age. I have attended school through the grade. I can read 
and understand die English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been 
provided to me. 1 was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which 
would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the 
influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of 
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental 
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understandmg what I am doing 
or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea. 
5 nd 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must 
file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced. I understand 
that for a plea held in abeyance, a motion to withdraw from the plea agreement must be 
made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest. I will only be allowed to withdraw 
my plea if I show that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. I understand that any 
challenge to my plea(s) made after sentencing must be pursued under the Post-
Conviction Remedies Act in Title 78, Chapter 35a, and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
Dated this ir day of
 m 
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DEFENDANT 
I certify that I am the attorney for 
Certificate of Defejnse Attorney 
_, the defendant 
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have 
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its 
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, 
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of 
the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other 
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are 
accurate and true. 
ATTORNEY^FOR DEFENDANT 
Bar No. ^ - f J 9 
TC 
Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney 
I certify tkat I am th^attorney for the State of Utah in the case against 
defendant I have reviewed this Statement of 
Defendant and fmd that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which 
constitutes the offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion 
to encourage a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained 
in the Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before 
the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the 
conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the 
acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interest 
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Bar No. 5*6^ 
7 
Order 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses 
the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely, 
knowingly, and voluntarily made. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the 
crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered. 
Dated this _/2^ day of fh{*^/ , 2 Qc) 7 
DISfBJCT COURT JUDGE 
Form revised 6/25/03 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE CITY 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-0O0-
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHARLES MOA, 
Defendant 
Case No. 031903971 
MOTION 
-0O0-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 5th day of October, 
2007, commencing at the hour of 1:38 p.m., the above-entitled 
matter came on for hearing before the HONORABLE JOHN PAUL 
KENNEDY, sitting as Judge in the above-named Court for the 
purpose of this cause, and that the following proceedings were 
had. 
-oOo-
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here violated this whole deal and that was going to put me 
back in jail and try to send me to prison for three to five 
and just seemed like it was just all a trick or something. 
MR. GARCIA: Excuse me, your Honor, but I--
THE COURT: Okay. Wait--wait just a minute, Mr. 
Garcia. He has made an evidentiary statement, do you wish to 
rebut that in any way? 
Do you want to talk to Mr. Garcia and find out if 
you want to rebut it? 
MS. JOHNSON: No, your Honor, because I think that 
even if Mr. Moa wants to make that evidentiary, the remedy the 
Supreme Court has stated is if agreement a part of the 
sentencing, the--the remedy is specific enforcement and so if 
the State dismissed that charge, it was specifically enforced; 
therefore, we're going back to the beginning, so I don't think 
we need to respond to any evidentiary issues. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. MOA: They only dismissed it after I--I told my 
new lawyer, Ljungberg, about the--about them violating the 
deal and the next time I came to Court, they didn't want to 
dismiss--then he went and talked to them and--
MR. LJUNGBERG: That's what--that's what I'm saying. 
THE COURT: All right. Okay. Well, thank you, I 
appreciate everybody's input in this matter today. 
Mr. Moa, I'm going to put your paper in the--in the 
20 
file for you. 
My feeling is that the plea was made knowingly, 
voluntarily and after a fairly, I think maybe unusually 
detailed effort to make sure that everybody understood what 
was going on, and particularly, Mr. Moa. The Court wanted to 
make sure he understood what was going on because of the 
history of the case and the dismissal of prior counsel for 
whatever reason it was, I didn't--I didn't want to go forward 
in this case with his inability to understand what was going 
on because of the change in counsel or any other factor, so 
that was one of the reasons why I wanted to make sure that it 
was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made. 
I was impressed with counsel's--the prosecution's 
efforts to try to explain everything. I was also impressed 
with Mr. Garcia's efforts to make sure that his client 
understood what was going on. During the course of the--of 
the colloquy it was apparent to the Court that he did 
understand and I--I found then and I reiterate now, that 
that's what I thought was happening. 
So, I have listened again to the colloquy, the tape 
of the colloquy, I've read the transcript. Nothing in what I 
heard or what I read would change my view of that, nothing 
that I've heard today or read in the papers submitted today 
would change my view of that. 
So, I'm going to deny the motion to withdraw the 
21 
plea and I'd ask you, Ms. Johnson, to prepare a short order, 
reiterating my findings and my holding today, my conclusions 
today. 
MS. JOHNSON: I will, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Okay. Thank you. 
MR. LJUNGBERG: Maybe we need to set another court 
date for this, Judge, because I don't think this has ever gone 
to sentencing yet. 
THE COURT: Well, it needs to go to sentencing. 
Have we gone--have we done anything that we need to do for the 
sentencing? Has there been a report prepared or--
MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, a pre-sentence report has 
been prepared, it wasn't fully completed because A P & P 
received information that he had filed a motion to withdraw 
his plea, but the interview part of it's been taken care of, 
the criminal history needs are taken care of--
THE COURT: Well, I--I think it needs to be fully 
completed and--and how much time do you think that it will 
take to have that done? Do you have any estimate that you 
want to give me? 
MS. JOHNSON: Your Honor, I think if we were to do 
it by the end of October, I think that by then, A P & P should 
be able to complete anything they didn't do prior to that, 
because they've already done the bulk of it, which usually 
takes the longest, which is the interview with the defendant. 
22 
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3 MR. TORRIENTE: Your Honor, can we call 
4 the Charles Moa case? 
5 THE COURT: Yes. 
6 MR. TORRIENTE: Sean Torriente for the 
7 State. 
8 MR. LJUNGBERG: And*Rob Ljungberg for 
9 Mr. Moa. 
10 THE COURT: Mr. Ljungberg, have you seen 
11 the AP&P correspondence regarding Daniel Lautaimi? 
12 MR. LJUNGBERG: Yes, that was provided to 
13 us today, Judge, and I provided a copy to Mr. Moa 
14 today as well. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. 
16 All right, Mr. Moa, ready for sentencing? 
17 MR. LJUNGBERG: We are, Judge. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. Anything that ought to 
19 be corrected in the presentence report? 
20 MR. LJUNGBERG: Well, Mr. Moa has 
21 expressed to me some questions and objections to the 
22 amount of restitution involved. I think it's going to 
23 be — 
24 THE COURT: Well, okay, I think we can 
25 handle that simply by giving it more time so that you 
3 J 
1 can — State can provide information and you can 
2 review it with Mr. Moa — 
3 MR. LJUNGBERG: Right. 
4 THE COURT: — and we'll have a hearing, 
5 if necessary. 
6 MR. LJUNGBERG: All right. That's clearly 
7 an objection that he h^s. 
8 We are asking the CQurt to not follow the 
9 recommendations in the presentence report for the 
10 consecutive sentences particularly with regard to 
11 these three counts. We feel that these were a single 
12 criminal episode. Mr. Moa has expressed remorse in 
13 his statement. I don't think itTs fair to say that he 
14 hasn't taken responsibility because he did enter a 
15 guilty plea to this case. 
16 And for those reasons, Judge, we'd ask 
17 that you consider running this case, the three counts 
18 here, concurrent with each other even if you want to 
19 run it consecutive to his other commitment. 
20 I know Mr. Moa also wants to make a 
21 statement as well. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. 
23 THE DEFENDANT: Just what he said, 
24 thatT s. . . 
25 THE COURT: Okay. 
1 The State? 
2 MR. TORRIENTE: Your Honor, the State 
3 agrees with the recommendations. 
4 Just to give a little bit of background as 
5 to what occurred at this home: There had been — 
6 there was a murder in front of that home in February. 
7 One of the bullets went into the Pautitefea home and 
8 hit a young girl in the head. 
9 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
10 MR. TORRIENTE: It didn't kill her, 
11 luckily. 
12 Mr. Moa gets released from custody. 
13 Within two days, there's a shooting again at this 
14 home. 
15 Neighbors come out, there's some 
16 witnesses, not enough to put together a case but 
17 police are looking for Mr. Moa. 
18 And then in a few more days, there's 
19 another shooting. Witnesses — neighbors were so fed 
20 up, one of them jumped in a car and chased Mr. Moa 
21 upon the freeway for a lengthy period of time. 
22 Police get involved. As soon as the 
23 police get involved, he hits an officer head on in the 
24 patrol car. Comes at another officer, that officer 
25 has to swerve out of the way, damages another police 
1 car which actually is not even included in the 
2 restitution amount. That was the West Valley City 
3 police car. 
4 Goes on the freeway, speeds up to 130 
5 miles an hour. Finally gets caught by a hit maneuver, 
6 finally stops him. Even then, he runs; has to get 
7 tased. 
8 Officers find a gun „in the car which 
9 matches from the earlier shooting. 
10 The State's position is that heTs 
11 extremely dangerous. There's not just one victim in 
12 this case. This is a whole neighborhood who had 
13 multiple shootings, and finally got Mr. Moa because 
14 the citizens were willing to step up and put their own 
15 lives in danger. They are tired of it. 
16 So I think the longer we can have him in 
17 custody, the better. 
18 THE COURT: Okay. 
19 Anything else, Mr. Ljungberg? 
20 MR. LJUNGBERG: We'd submit it, Judge. 
21 THE COURT: I see Mr. Moa as an extreme 
22 danger to any community that he happens to be in — 
23 THE DEFENDANT: I'm really not. 
24 THE COURT: I donTt believe you, 
25 Zero to five on the Discharge of a 
1 Firearm, zero to five on the Failure to Respond, zero 
2 to five on the Aggravated Assault; all consecutive to 
3 each other and all consecutive to any other commitment 
4 that Mr. Moa might have. 
5 MR. LJUNGBERG: With regard to the 
6 restitution issue, Judge? 
7 THE COURT: Restitution will be open for 
8 120 days; 1,000 fine; $350 Recoupment Fee. 
9 MR. LJUNGBERG: Could the State just 
10 provide proof of these damages within a period of time 
11 so that we can respond to that? 
12 MR. TORRIENTE: WeTll have that within 120 
13 days. 
14 And did the Court say three to five on the 
15 Discharge or zero to five? 
16 THE COURT: I said zero to five. That was 
17 my mistake; three to five on the Discharge of the 
18 Firearm. 
19 MR. LJUNGBERG: Thanks, Judge. We! 11 
20 submit the appropriate request. 
21 I (Hearing Adjourned at 9:30 a.m.) 
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